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I. INTRODUCTION
In the area of reproductive rights in the United States, one of the biggest
developments in the last several years has been the so-called contraceptive coverage
mandate. The mandate requires employers, group health plans, and health insurance
issuers to cover all United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and
counseling.1 The Obama Administration chose to mandate this coverage in rules it
promulgated, specifying the preventive health services for women that must be
covered under the Affordable Care Act (ACA).2
1
2

See infra Part II.

On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Then, on March 30, 2010, he signed the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act (HCERA). Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.
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Since its promulgation, hundreds of citizens, businesses, and nonprofit and
religious organizations have challenged the mandate in dozens of lawsuits, which are
at various stages of litigation.3 The Supreme Court of the United States ruled on two
cases that were brought by family-owned businesses that objected to four of the
twenty FDA-approved contraceptives.4 Both Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (Hobby
Lobby) and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation (Conestoga Wood) objected to
two drugs, commonly known as “Plan B” and “Ella,” as well as to two intrauterine
devices (IUDs) that operate after fertilization and prevent uterine implantation of
fertilized eggs (human embryos), thus causing an abortifacient effect.5 Although
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood objected to paying for these four methods of
contraception, they otherwise provided health insurance to their employees,
including methods of contraception that they do not oppose on religious grounds.6
This Article studies the contraceptive coverage mandate from three different
perspectives. First, it provides a historical treatment of the regulatory rules adopted
by agencies in the Obama Administration – specifically, the Departments of the
Treasury, Labor, and Health and Human Services, which this Article collectively
refers to as “the Administration” or “the Departments” – that imposed the mandate,
focusing specifically on the rulemaking processes used to develop and promulgate
the rules. In performing this historical study, the Article traces the development of
the mandate from its root in the ACA to full implementation in legislative
(substantive) rules finalized by the Administration in the summer of 2013.7 Second,
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). This Article will refer to these laws collectively as either the
“Affordable Care Act” or the “ACA.” For a discussion of the relevant provisions of the ACA,
the mandate, and the regulatory rules developed by the Administration that implement the
mandate, see infra Part II.
3 See THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hhs
informationcentral (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) (accessible and comprehensive collection of
cases and litigation documents); see also NATIONAL WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, http://www.
nwlc.org/status-lawsuits-challenging-affordable-care-acts-birth-control-coverage-benefit (last
visited Nov. 8, 2014) (survey of lawsuits and summaries of the status of pending cases).
4

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). In Hobby Lobby Stores,
the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s ruling in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723
F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), and reversed and remanded the ruling of the Third Circuit in
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013). See also Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/sebelius-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) (materials and
commentary relating to the Hobby Lobby Stores case); see also Conestoga Wood Specialties
Corp. v. Burwell, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/conestogawood-specialties-corp-v-sebelius (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) (materials and commentary
relating to the Conestoga Wood Specialties case).
5 Brief for Respondents at *4, sub nom Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2014 WL
546899 (No. 13-354); Brief for Petitioners at *4, sub nom Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp.
v. Sebelius, 2014 WL 173487 (No. 13-356).
6 See Brief for Petitioners at *5, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 2014 WL
173487 (No. 13-356); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *1, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp.
v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 5291412 (No. 13-356); see also Hobby Lobby Media Information and
Fact Sheet, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, http://www.becketfund.org/hobby
lobbyfactsheet (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
7

See infra Part II.
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this Article evaluates the mandate under the legal framework established by
Congress in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),8 focusing especially on
the Administration’s RFRA analysis in its rulemaking materials and the Supreme
Court’s recent ruling regarding the mandate.9 Third, it analyzes the mandate under a
moral and policy-based framework proposed by a team of leading bioethicists,
public health policy analysts, and scholars. It applies the team’s proposed framework
to determine whether the Departments that developed and adopted the mandate
satisfied the various moral and policy considerations that these experts have
highlighted.10
The analyses in this Article will establish the following four points:
(1) The Administration chose to employ regulatory procedures that failed to
ensure transparency, hindered meaningful public participation, hampered
dialogue between policymakers and interested individuals and
organizations, and deprived the public of the deliberative process agency
rulemaking is supposed to afford.
(2) In its rulemaking, the Administration’s consideration of the First
Amendment and RFRA was cursory and untimely. Consequently, the
Administration failed adequately to consider the religious freedom
implications of creating by regulatory rule a positive right to coverage that
conflicted with a negative right grounded in the First Amendment that
Congress had reinforced in RFRA.
(3) In developing the mandate, the Administration failed adequately to address
basic moral and policy considerations that provide concrete guidance for
evaluating and justifying public health initiatives. Consequently, the
Administration’s deliberations about and justifications for this public health
initiative were unsatisfactory, failing adequately to resolve conflicts that the
initiative created among general moral considerations.
(4) In adopting the regulatory rules and imposing the mandate, the
Administration “legislated” its conception of morality. The mandate does
not simply represent the policy judgments of the policymakers, but also the
moral judgments of the policymakers based upon their progressive moral
vision and values.11 Thus, although the mandate is framed in regulatory,
8

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 13-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).

9

See infra Part III.

10

See infra Part IV.

11

The aim of this Article is not to explicate progressive morality, nor to explore its
ideological foundations, nor to trace its contours. Rather, it is to analyze the mandate from
three perspectives. In the process, however, this Article will reveal that moral decision-making
undergirds the mandate. The term “progressive” here refers to a set of ideological, moral, and
political beliefs and values shared by proponents of a current movement as well as proponents
of an earlier movement in United States history. The earlier movement, which historians
identify with the Progressive Era of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, altered the
American landscape in fundamental ways, and its effects were felt in all sectors of society and
culture—business, education, government, law, religion, and science. See generally LEWIS L.
GOULD, AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890–1914 (2001); THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (Lewis
L. Gould, ed., 1974); WALTER NUGENT, PROGRESSIVISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
(2010); Daniel T. Rogers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REV. AM. HIST. 113 (1982). In
government and law, the Progressives manifested great confidence that “unbiased” physical
and social sciences and technical expertise, reason and decisions based upon empirical data,
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public health, social scientific, and medical terminology, it advances a
particular moral vision, is premised upon the moral values held by the
policymakers, and reflects their conception of what is “good” and what
constitutes a “good society.”12
and government, its administrative apparatus, and “administratively organized ‘communities’
of highly trained, objective professionals” would lead society forward and bring about
transformative social, legal, and economic reforms. Joel D. Schwartz, Book Review, Liberty,
Democracy, and the Origins of American Bureaucracy, 97 HARV. L. REV. 815, 820 (1984).
For the Progressives, science, expertise, and administration held the promise of the future, and
the interests of businesses and business owners and the concerns of lay people were
understood as obstacles to the desired progress. See generally RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, THE
PARTY PERIOD AND PUBLIC POLICY: AMERICAN POLITICS FROM THE AGE OF JACKSON TO THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA (1988); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY
1830-1900 (1982); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION (1988); DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: A STUDY OF THE
POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1984); ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE
SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in
American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in
Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986). As for the current manifestation of
progressivism, scholars on both the left and the right have begun to identify a progressive
movement currently underway. See Charles Murray, The Trouble Isn’t Liberals. It’s
Progressives. WALL STREET J. (July 1, 2014) (“[P]rogressive intellectuals [a century ago] were
passionate advocates of rule by disinterested experts led by a strong unifying leader. They
were in favor of using the state to mold social institutions in the interests of the collective.
They thought that individualism and the Constitution were both outmoded. . . . It is that core
philosophy extolling the urge to mold society that still animates progressives today—a
mindset that produces the shutdown of debate and growing intolerance that we are witnessing
in today’s America. Such thinking on the left also is behind the rationales for indulging
President Obama in his anti-constitutional use of executive power. . . . [W]e should start using
‘liberal’ to designate the good guys on the left, reserving ‘progressive’ for those who are
enthusiastic about an unrestrained regulatory state, who think it’s just fine to subordinate the
interests of individuals to large social projects, who cheer the president’s abuse of executive
power and who have no problem rationalizing the stifling of dissent.”); Jeffrey D. Sachs, The
New Progressive Movement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011) (“Following our recent financial
calamity, a third progressive era is likely to be in the making. This one should aim for three
things. The first is a revival of crucial public services, especially education, training, public
investment and environmental protection. The second is the end of a climate of impunity that
encouraged nearly every Wall Street firm to commit financial fraud. The third is to reestablish the supremacy of people votes over dollar votes in Washington. . . . The new
movement also needs to build a public policy platform. The American people have it
absolutely right on the three main points of a new agenda. To put it simply: tax the rich, end
the wars and restore honest and effective government for all.”)
12 From its inception, the recent health care reform effort in the United States that
culminated in the enactment of the ACA has seemingly been inspired by a particular moral
vision. In a letter to President Obama written nearly ten months before the President signed
the ACA into law, the late Senator Edward Kennedy highlighted their shared commitment to
health care reform. See Letter from Senator Edward M. Kennedy to President, Barack Obama
(May 12, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Text-of-letter-to-the-Presidentfrom-Senator-Edward-M-Kennedy. Senator Kennedy observed that health care “concerns
more than material things; . . . what we face is above all a moral issue; . . . at stake are not just
the details of policy, but fundamental principles of social justice and the character of our
country.” Id.

2015]

LEGISLATING MORALITY PROGRESSIVELY

67

II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND REGARDING THE CONTRACEPTIVE
COVERAGE MANDATE
A. The Relevant Affordable Care Act Provisions
The ACA did not mandate that employers and health insurance plans cover
contraceptives, sterilization, or patient education and services. Rather, the ACA
required group health plans and health insurance issuers offering group or individual
health insurance coverage to cover several broad categories of preventive health
services.13 The following were among the required preventive health services:
(1) Evidence-based items or services recommended with a rating of A or B by
the United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF);14 and
(2) As to women, preventive care and screenings (in addition to those items and
services recommended by the USPSTF) provided for in comprehensive
guidelines supported by the U.S. Health Resources and Services
Administration (HRSA).15

13 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 131
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012)).
14

Id. See About the USPSTF, U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVICES TASK FORCE,
http://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Name/about-the-uspstf (last visited Nov.
9, 2014). The USPSTF is an independent, volunteer panel of primary care providers with
expertise in prevention and evidence-based medicine. Id. The task force conducts scientific
evidence reviews of clinical preventive services (such as screenings, counseling, and
preventive medications) and makes recommendations for primary care clinicians and health
systems. Janelle Guirguis-Blake, et al., Current Processes of the U.S. Preventive Service Task
Force: Refining Evidence-Based Recommendation Development, 147 ANNALS OF INTERNAL
MEDICINE 117, 117 (2007), available at http://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/
Home/GetFile/6/7/currprocess/pdf. The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ)
within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provides the task force
administrative, research, technical, and dissemination support. See id. The Director of AHRQ
appoints new USPSTF members, with guidance provided by the Chair of the task force. U.S.
Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF): An Introduction, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE
RESEARCH AND QUALITY, http://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/clinicians-providers/guidelinesrecommendations/uspstf/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
15 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 131
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012)). HRSA is an agency within HHS that seeks to
improve access to health care services. See About HRSA, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.,
http://www.hrsa.gov/about/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2014). This particular provision
(the Women’s Health Amendment) was added to the bill that became the ACA in the Senate.
Proponents of this provision thought that this additional coverage mandate for women would
fill a gap in the initially proposed version of the preventive health services coverage mandate.
Press Release, Sen. Barbara A. Mikulski, Mikulski Puts Women First in Health Care Reform
Debate: Senator Introduces First Amendment to Senate Health Care Reform Bill to Guarantee
Women Access to Preventive Screenings and Care at No Cost (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www
.mikulski.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/mikulski-puts-women-first-in-health-carereform-debate. See also 155 Cong. Rec. 28841, 29070 (2009) (statements of Senators Boxer
and Mikulski).
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The ACA prohibited the imposition of cost-sharing requirements (e.g,
copayments, coinsurance, and deductibles) as to these covered items and services.16
As the grandfathered status of health plans is lost over time, most health plans and
health insurance issuers (and employers) will be required to cover the specified
preventive services free of charge to beneficiaries and employees.17
B. The Regulations
Subsequently, the Obama Administration adopted regulatory rules implementing
these provisions of the ACA. It was in these rulemakings that the Administration
decided to include all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization
procedures, and patient education and counseling within the required package of
covered preventive health services.
1. The July 2010 Interim Final Rulemaking
In July 2010, about four months after the ACA was enacted,18 the Administration
issued a set of interim final rules.19 These interim final rules, consistent with the
ACA, required health plans and health insurance issuers to provide coverage of the
following relevant categories of items and services:
(1) Evidence-based items and services recommended by the USPSTF with a
rating of A or B; and
(2) For women, evidence-informed preventive care and screening provided for
in comprehensive guidelines supported by the HRSA.20

16 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1001, 124 Stat.
131 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012)). The ACA elsewhere specifies that the
term “cost-sharing” includes: “deductibles, coinsurance, copayments, or similar charges,” and
“any other expenditure required of an insured individual which is a qualified medical expense
. . . with respect to essential health benefits covered by the plan.” Id. at § 1302(c)(3)(A)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(3)(A)).
17 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1251, 124 Stat.
119 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18011). The Departments’ regulatory materials indicate
that the grandfathered status under the ACA “is only transitional in effect, and [that] it is
expected that a majority of plans will lose their grandfathered status by the end of 2013.” See
also Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg.
39,870, 39,887 n.49 (July 2, 2013) [hereinafter July 2013 Final Rules].
18 President Obama signed the ACA on March 23 and the HCERA on March 30 of 2010.
See supra note 2.
19

See Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to
Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75
Fed. Reg. 41,726, 41,728 (July 19, 2010) [hereinafter Interim Final Rules]. In the regulatory
materials, the Departments indicated that they were issuing other interim final rules to
implement various provisions of the ACA, including: the provision requiring dependent
coverage of children to age 26; the provision relating to status as a grandfathered health plan;
and the provisions prohibiting preexisting condition exclusions, regarding lifetime and annual
dollar limits on benefits, regarding restrictions on rescissions, and regarding patient
protections. Id.
20

Id. at 41,756–59.
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The regulatory materials indicated that the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) was developing comprehensive guidelines for preventive care and
screening for women and expected to issue them no later than August 1, 2011.21
These interim final rules were effective on September 17, 2010, the same date
comments from the public and interested persons were due.22 The Departments’
decision to issue interim final rules, instead of following the standard notice-andcomment process that would have ensured meaningful public participation and full
vetting of the rules before they went into effect,23 meant that the rules would be
effective without comments from the public on any proposed rules being reviewed
and considered by the Departments prior to the effective date.24 The Administration
justified its decision to sidestep standard rulemaking procedures and instead to use
the truncated rulemaking process on the following two grounds:
(1) Statutory grounds in the Internal Revenue Code, the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, and the Public Health Service Act;25 and
(2) Good cause because “a full public notice and comment process” was
impracticable and contrary to the public interest.26
The Departments’ position was thus that they had statutory authority to employ
the interim final rulemaking process and that the good cause exception to notice-andcomment rulemaking applied. Citing provisions of the ACA, the Departments
asserted that this expedited rulemaking process was necessary to ensure that the
regulations would be in place for plan years and policy years beginning on or after
September 23, 2010, and that coverage would be implemented on a timely basis.27
Accordingly, the Departments determined to push the rules through, even though it
meant that public participation would be restricted and that their consideration of the
feedback received from the public regarding the rules would be delayed by nearly a
year.
21

Id. at 41,728.

22

Id. at 41,726.

23

Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), agencies ordinarily adopt regulations
pursuant to standard rulemaking procedures that require agencies (1) to give the public and
interested persons notice of proposed rules, (2) to afford the public opportunity to comment on
(i.e., participate in the rulemaking and give feedback regarding) proposals, and (3) to review
the feedback received, modify proposals based upon the feedback, state in writing the reasons
for adopting the final version of the rules, and issue the final rules. Upon issuing final rules,
agencies specify the effective date. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. The APA provides some exceptions to
these procedural requirements, including the good cause exemption when notice and the
public procedure are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. 5 U.S.C. §
553(a), (b)(A), & (b)(B).
24

See Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV.
703, 704 (1999) (“Interim-final rules are rules adopted by federal agencies that become
effective without prior notice and public comment and that invite post-effective public
comment . . . . [The interim-final] rule is effective immediately but it also serves as a notice of
proposed rulemaking for the final rule that will supplant it.”).
25 See Interim Final Rules, supra note 19, at 41,729–30 (listing as relevant federal statutes
26 U.S.C. § 9833 (2012), 29 U.S.C. § 1191c (2012), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-92 (2012)).
26

See Interim Final Rules, supra note 19, at 41,730 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012)).

27

Id.
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It quickly became apparent that aspects of the HRSA guidelines being developed
by HHS would be controversial. Upon the Departments’ issuance of the interim final
rules and public announcement regarding the development of the guidelines, the
Planned Parenthood Federation of America launched its campaign to ensure that the
guidelines would require coverage of family planning and all FDA-approved
contraceptives with no cost-sharing.28 Two months later, the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) urged the Administration not to include
coverage of contraception and sterilization in the list of preventive services that
group and individual health plans must cover.29
2. The Institute of Medicine Committee Recommendations
Although the interim final rules did not mandate coverage of contraceptive and
sterilization services, the rulemaking paved the way by requiring health plans and
health insurance issuers to cover evidence-informed preventive care and screenings
provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by HRSA. The Departments
indicated that the guidelines were in development and expected by August 1, 2011.30
The HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation provided
funds for the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to convene a committee to conduct a

28 See Press Release, Planned Parenthood Fed’n of America, Planned Parenthood Supports
Initial White House Regulations on Preventive Care; Highlights Need for New Guidelines on
Women’s Preventive Health to Include Family Planning (July 14, 2010), http://www.planned
parenthood.org/about-us/newsroom/press-releases/planned-parenthood-supports-initial-whitehouse-regulations-preventive-care-highlights-need-new. When the interim final rules were
issued, Planned Parenthood was ready to go with its campaign, and it was fortunate to have
individuals friendly to its viewpoint well-positioned within HHS. Reports have shown that
Kathleen Sebelius, the HHS Secretary who approved the mandate, had longstanding ties to
and received political contributions from the late George Tiller, a Kansas doctor well-known
for performing late-term abortions. See Deanna Candler, The Advisors Behind the
Contraceptive Mandate, LIVE ACTION BLOG (Feb. 24, 2012), http://liveaction.org/blog/theadvisors-behind-the-contraception-mandate/; Penny Starr, Sebelius: ‘Keeping Our Children
Safe . . . Most Fundamental Task,’ CNSNEWS.COM (May 7, 2013), http://cnsnews.com/news/
article/sebelius-keeping-our-children-safe-most-fundamental-task. Additionally, Washington,
D.C. attorney and former drug lobbyist William B. Schultz, whose clients at Zuckerman
Spaeder LLP included Barr Laboratories, the maker of Plan B, became HHS’s principal
deputy general counsel and acting general counsel in 2011 and HHS’s general counsel in
2013. See Timothy P. Carney, Obama Nominates Ex-drug Lobbyist as Top HHS Lawyer,
WASHINGTON EXAMINER (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/tim-carneyobama-nominates-ex-drug-lobbyist-as-top-hhs-lawyer/article/2516459; Steven Ertelt, Obama
Names Lobbyist for Plan B Drug as Top HHS Lawyer, FREE REPUBLIC (Dec. 20, 2012),
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2971046/posts; U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services, Press Release, HHS Secretary Sebelius Announces Senate Confirmation of
William B. Schultz, Nominee for General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services
(Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/04/20130426a.html.
29 Press Release, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, USCCB Officials Urge HHS Not to
Require Coverage of Contraception and Sterilization (Sept. 20, 2010),
http://usccb.org/news/2010/10-162.cfm.
30

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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review of what preventive services are necessary for women’s health and well-being
and what services should be considered in developing comprehensive guidelines.31
The IOM Committee on Preventive Services for Women was formed to develop
recommendations to fill possible gaps in recommended preventive services.32 The
sixteen-member committee held five meetings over a six-month period and
conducted three open sessions for presentations by invited stakeholders, women’s
health experts, and reproductive rights advocates and to hear from members of the
public.33 Pro-choice and reproductive-choice advocates and interest groups such
Planned Parenthood, the Guttmacher Institute, and the National Women’s Law
Center were well-represented among the committee members and the invited
presenters.34
On July 19, 2011, the Committee issued a 235-page report that included various
recommendations.35 The Committee recommended that eight preventive health
services for women be added to the services that health plans must cover at no cost
to patients.36 Among them was a recommendation that the full range of “FDAapproved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and
counseling (i.e., family planning services) for women” with reproductive capacity be
covered.37 For this recommendation, the Committee’s express objectives were
“preventing unintended pregnancy and promoting healthy birth spacing.”38
One member, Anthony Lo Sasso, Ph.D., dissented from the committee report,
expressing concern that the compressed period of time prevented the Committee
from conducting a serious, systematic review of all evidence for preventive
services.39 Beyond the time constraints, he noted that the Committee’s process
“lacked transparency and was largely subject to the preferences of the Committee’s
31 See COMMITTEE ON PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
CLINICAL PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN: CLOSING THE GAPS 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter
CLOSING THE GAPS REPORT].
32

Id. at 2.

33

Id. at v–vi, 217–21, 223–30.

34

See id. at 223–30 (referencing Appendix C and biographies provided by the Committee
regarding members Dr. Angela Diaz, Dr. Francisco Garcia, Dr. Paula A. Johnson, and Dr.
Alina Salganicoff, which fail to note the prior advocacy and interest group affiliations and
memberships of these individuals); see id. at 218-19 (identifying several invited presenters);
see also Helen M. Alvaré, No Compelling Interest: The “Birth Control” Mandate and
Religious Freedom, 58 VILL. L. REV. 379, 430 (2013) (citing Letter from Anna Franzonello,
Staff Counsel, Ams. United for Life, to Ctrs. for Medicare and Medicaid Servs. (Sept. 29,
2011) (on file at www.freedom2care.org/docLib/20110929_AmericansUnitedforLife
preventiveservicescomment.pdf.).
35 See CLOSING THE GAPS REPORT, supra note 31, at ix–x; see also Press Release, Institute
of Medicine of the National Academies of Science, Report at a Glance (July 19, 2011),
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011/Clinical-Preventive-Services-for-Women-Closing-theGaps/Press-Release.aspx.
36

See CLOSING THE GAPS REPORT, supra note 31, at 1, 7–12.

37

Id. at 10, 109–10.

38

Id. at 102.

39

See id. at 231.
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composition,” in which “a mix of objective and subjective determinations [were]
filtered through a lens of advocacy.”40
3. The HRSA August 2011 Comprehensive Guidelines
Soon thereafter, HRSA adopted the IOM Committee’s recommendations and
issued the Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines.41 Under the HRSA-supported
coverage guidelines, non-grandfathered plans are generally required to cover various
preventive services without cost sharing, including the following: “All Food and
Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and
patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.”42
4. The August 2011 Amended Interim Final Rulemaking
The Departments then issued amended interim final rules.43 These rules reiterated
the requirement that health plan coverage must include preventive care and
screenings provided for in binding comprehensive guidelines supported by HRSA.44
In this rulemaking, and for the first time, the Administration addressed the
considerable volume of comments submitted by the public and interested persons
regarding the first set of interim final rules.45 Some of the commenters raised
concerns regarding the requirement that religious employers cover contraceptive
services that might be objectionable on religious grounds.46
In these rules, the Departments acknowledged the appropriateness of HRSA
considering the effect of a coverage mandate on the religious beliefs of certain
employers when employees in “certain religious positions participate,” and they
expressed a willingness to “provide for a religious accommodation that respects the
unique relationship between a house of worship and its employees in ministerial
positions.”47 Accordingly, the Departments granted HRSA discretion to establish an
exemption for certain religious employers as to contraceptive coverage.48 The
40

Id. at 232.

41

Health Res. and Serv. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Affordable Care
Act Expands Prevention Coverage for Women’s Health and Well-Being, HRSA.GOV,
http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
42

Id. See also Press Release, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Affordable Care Act
Ensures Women Receive Preventive Services at No Additional Cost (Aug. 1, 2011) (on file at
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/08/20110801b.html).
43 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621 (Aug. 3,
2011) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) [hereinafter
Amended Interim Final Rules].
44

Id. at 46,625–26.

45 See id. at 46,623 (stating that the public had provided “considerable feedback regarding
which preventive services for women” should be covered).
46

See id.

47

Id.

48

See id. at 46,623; id. at 46,626 (granting HRSA discretion to “establish exemptions
from [the] guidelines with respect to [] plans established or maintained by religious
employers” and from “coverage provided in connection with [] plans established or
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Departments defined the term “religious employer” narrowly for purposes of the
mandate, requiring an employer to meet the following to qualify for the exemption:
(1) The inculcation of religious values must be the purpose of the
organization;
(2) The organization must primarily employ persons who share the
religious tenets of the organization;
(3) The organization must primarily serve persons who share the religious
tenets of the organization; and
(4) The organization must be a nonprofit organization as described in
section 6033(a)(1) and section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.49
The Departments adopted this narrow definition in an effort to “reasonably
balance” their goal of extending coverage to as many women as possible while
respecting “the unique relationship between certain religious employers and their
employees in certain religious positions.”50
The Administration again chose to employ the interim final rulemaking process,
rather than the standard notice-and-comment rulemaking process.51 Unlike the
interim final rules issued one year earlier,52 the amended interim final rules were
effective immediately on August 1, 2011, and comments were due sixty days later on
September 30, 2011.53 The Departments again justified their use of the truncated
rulemaking process by citing federal statutory authority.54 Additionally, in the
Departments’ view, the policy behind the generally required notice-and-comment
process was satisfied by virtue of the public having had opportunity to comment on
the initial interim final rules, and the amendments being made in the amended
interim final rules were based on the public comments they received.55 Furthermore,
the Departments concluded, “an additional opportunity for public comment on the
amended interim final rules before they were made effective was impracticable and
contrary to the public interest.”56 Providing such an additional opportunity for public
comment would, in the Administration’s view, delay coverage for another year
because many plan years and policy years begin in August or September.57 Similarly,
the Departments asserted that good cause existed for waiving the general
requirement that final rules be made effective no sooner than thirty days after they
maintained by religious employers with respect to any requirement to cover” the mandated
services); see also U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., supra note 41.
49

Amended Interim Final Rules, supra note 43, at 46,623.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 46,621.

52

See supra Part II.B.1.

53

Amended Interim Final Rules, supra note 43, at 46,621.

54

Id. at 46,624.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.
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are published, and thus waived the thirty-day delay requirement, making the rules
effective immediately.58
5. The February 2012 Final Rulemaking
In February 2012, the Departments finalized their interim final rules.59 In these
“final-final rules”60 regarding coverage of preventive services, the Departments
made no changes to their interim final rules,61 despite the fact that the Departments
received over 200,000 comments, and despite the lawsuits instituted challenging the
mandate.62 The Administration’s decision to retain the narrow definition for the
exemption for religious employers occurred after a November 2011 meeting between
President Obama and then-Archbishop Timothy Dolan, who was serving as
president of the USCCB.63 At this meeting, President Obama indicated that he takes
the protection of the rights of conscience with the “utmost seriousness,” and that he
did not want to impede the Catholic Church’s work.64 The final rules were effective
on April 16, 2012.65
The 200,000-plus responses were submitted by an array of individuals and
organizations with different perspectives, and they raised a range of concerns, both
in favor of and in opposition to the Administration’s narrow religious-employer
exemption.66 Some commenters suggested that the religious-employer exemption
should be rescinded in its entirety so that benefits could extend to as many women as
possible, and others, for the same reason, maintained that the exemption and the
58

Id.

59

See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725
(Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Final Rules].
60

See Asimow, supra note 24, at 705 (providing description of “final-final” and “interimfinal” rule terminology).
61

Final Rules, supra note 59, at 8725.

62

Id. at 8,726. Belmont Abbey College in Belmont, North Carolina, and Colorado
Christian University in Lakewood, Colorado, brought two early lawsuits challenging the
mandate. Their lawsuits were filed in November 2011 and December 2011, respectively. The
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Press Release, Belmont Abbey College Sues the Federal
Government over New Obamacare Mandate (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.becketfund.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/Press-Release-HHS-Final11.10.11.pdf; The Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty, Press Release, Colorado Christian University First Evangelical University
to Fight Abortifacient Mandate (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.becketfund.org/?p=3304
&preview=true. For copies of the complaints filed in these cases, see Belmont Abbey College
v. Sebelius, Case No. 1:11-cv-01989 (D.D.C. 2011), http://www.becketfund.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/HHS-Complaint-Final11.10.11.pdf, and Colorado Christian
University v. Sebelius, Case No. 11-cv-03350 (D. Colo. 2011), http://www.becketfund.org/
wp-content/uploads/2011/12/CCU-v-Sebelius-Complaint-final.pdf.
63

James Taranto, When the Archbishop Met the President, WALL ST. J., (Mar. 31, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303816504577311800821270184.
64

Id. For additional discussion of this meeting, see infra Part IV.C.2.c.

65

Final Rules, supra note 59, at 8725.

66

Id. at 8726.
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definition of religious employer should not be broadened.67 The following arguments
were among those submitted in favor of expanding the exemption and broadening
the definition of religious-employer: requiring organizations to pay for contraceptive
services would compel them to act contrary to their religious beliefs; federal laws
have provided for conscience clauses and religious exemptions broader than the
currently contemplated exemption; and the narrow scope of the exemption raises
concerns under the First Amendment and RFRA.68 Commenters also suggested
alternative definitions of religious employer.69
In addition to issuing this final-final rule adopting the narrowly defined
exemption, the Administration announced that it would afford a one-year
enforcement safe harbor to some non-exempt, nonprofit organizations with religious
objections.70 The Departments indicated that, during the safe-harbor period, they
would develop and propose changes to the rules to meet two goals: (1) “providing
contraceptive coverage without cost-sharing to individuals who want it,” and (2)
“accommodating non-exempted, non-profit organizations’ religious objections to
covering contraceptive services.”71 The Departments anticipated developing new
rules that would “require issuers to offer insurance without contraception coverage to
such an employer (or plan sponsor) and simultaneously to offer contraceptive
coverage directly to the employer’s plan participants (and their beneficiaries) who
desire it, with no cost-sharing.”72
In justifying their decision to finalize the interim final rules without any change,
the Departments listed various beneficial results expected from the mandated
coverage including:
(1) Greater use of preventive services yields a healthier population and reduces
health care costs;
(2) Women have unique health care needs (such as contraceptive services) and
burdens;
(3) Women who are not immediately aware of a pregnancy and who experience
unintended pregnancy may delay receiving prenatal care and continue to
engage in high-risk behaviors and are at risk of preterm birth and low birth
weight;
(4) For some women, pregnancy is contraindicated;
(5) Contraceptive use provides preventive health benefits relating to conditions
other than pregnancy; and

67

Id. at 8726–27.

68

Id. at 8727; see also Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.
(2012).
69

Final Rules, supra note 59, at 8725.

70 Id. at 8727–28; see Taranto supra note 63 (suggesting that this safe harbor, in
Archbishop Dolan’s view, simply gave religious institutions one year to figure out how they
would violate their consciences). Additionally, the political effect of the one-year safe harbor
was to release some pressure and delay some fallout from the mandate until after the 2012
presidential election. See infra note 139.
71

Final Rules, supra note 59, at 8727.

72

Id. at 8728.
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(6) Employers will experience cost savings by avoiding medical costs related to
pregnancy and indirect costs related to employee absences and reduced
productivity.73
The Departments also identified several social concerns and goals behind their
decision to mandate coverage of these services:
(1) The unique health needs of women place them at a disadvantage in the
workforce compared to male coworkers;
(2) Access to contraception improves the social and economic status of women;
(3) Contraceptive coverage eliminates disparities in the workforce by allowing
women to achieve equal status as healthy and productive members of the
job force by reducing the number of unintended pregnancies and potentially
unhealthy pregnancies;
(4) Cost sharing can be a significant barrier to effective contraception; and
(5) Providing women broad access to preventive services, including
contraceptive services, will reduce disparities.74
As to the scope of the religious-employer exemption, the Departments stated that
the exemption as adopted did not undermine the benefits of the mandated coverage
because the narrow definition of religious employer helped to ensure that the
employees affected would already share the employer’s beliefs.75 Additionally, in
their view, a broader exemption would result in more employees having to pay out of
their own pockets for contraceptives and fewer employees using contraceptive
services, which would undermine the claimed benefits of the preventive services.76
The Departments also expressed concern that expanding the scope of the religiousemployer exemption would subject employees to the religious views of their
employers, limit access to contraceptives, and inhibit the use of such services.77
The Departments concluded their discussion of the reasons supporting their finalfinal rules by briefly addressing conscience and religious freedom. The Departments
believed that their rules did not undermine conscience or conscience protections
because the rules neither prevented employers or others from expressing their
opposition to contraceptive use, nor compelled use of contraceptives, nor required
health care providers to prescribe contraceptives.78 Additionally, in their view, the
rules did not undermine conscience protections or religious exemptions recognized
in other federal laws; rather, they asserted, such protections would “be respected”
and “strongly enforced.”79 The Departments briefly considered the First Amendment
and RFRA, opining that their approach in the rules was consistent with both.80
73

Id. at 8727–28.
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Id. at 8728.

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 8729.
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Id.

80 Id. For additional discussion regarding the Departments’ consideration of the First
Amendment and RFRA, see infra Part III.
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6. The February and August 2012 Guidance
HHS issued a guidance document regarding the one-year enforcement safe
harbor for non-exempted, non-grandfathered group health plans established and
maintained by nonprofit organizations with religious objections to contraceptive
coverage. The guidance was first issued on February 10, 2012, and then with minor
clarifying amendments on August 15, 2012.81 The safe harbor was available only to a
defined set of organizations: nonprofit organizations whose plans had consistently
not covered all or the same subset of contraceptive services for religious reasons at
any point from the February 10, 2012 issuance of the guidance onward.82 The
guidance document specified the criteria that employers, plans, and issuers had to
meet to qualify for the safe harbor and, thereby, avoid for one year an enforcement
action for failing to cover some or all of the mandated services.83 To qualify for the
safe harbor, the organization was required to execute a certification document, and
the plan was required to provide participants a specified notice stating that some, or
all, contraceptive coverage would not be provided under the plan for the first plan
year beginning on or after August 1, 2012.84
7. The March 2012 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM)
In March 2012, the Departments issued an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking (ANPRM).85 The Departments announced an intention to amend
regulations regarding certain preventive health services and to establish alternative
ways of ensuring preventive health services coverage “when health coverage is
sponsored or arranged by a religious organization that objects to the coverage of
contraceptive services for religious reasons” but does not qualify for the religiousemployer exemption.86 The Departments provided for a ninety-day comment
period.87
The Departments indicated that the ANPRM was “the first step” toward
promulgating amended final rules before the end of the temporary enforcement safe
harbor so that any accommodation of religious objections by non-exempt, nonprofit
religious organizations would be in place at that time.88 The ANPRM made it clear
81 See Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight (CCIIO), Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs. (CMS), Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor for Certain Employers,
Group Health Plans and Group Health Insurance Issuers with Respect to the Requirement to
Cover Contraceptive Services Without Cost Sharing Under Section 2713 of the Public Health
Service Act, Section 715(a)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and Section
9815(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, CMS.GOV (Feb. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.nacua.org/documents/HHS_HealthInsurance_Guidance.pdf.
82

Id.

83

Id.

84

Id.

85

See Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501
(Mar. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Advance Notice]; Student Health Insurance Coverage, 77 Fed.
Reg. 16,453, 16,456–57 (Mar. 21, 2012).
86

Advance Notice, supra note 85, at 16,501.

87

Id.

88

Id. at 16,503.
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that the Departments had no intention of retreating from their mandate to cover all
“[FDA]-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient
education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity.”89 The
Departments used the ANPRM as a means of presenting “questions and ideas to help
shape” discussions with interested persons and stakeholders and to provide “an early
opportunity for any interested stakeholder to provide advice and input into the policy
development related to the accommodation to be made.”90 Among the larger
questions posed were: (1) Who qualifies for the accommodation?91 and (2) Who
administers the accommodation?92 Under each of these larger questions were a host
of sub-issues that required the Departments to gather information, as well as other
questions related to such matters as religious health insurance issuers or third-party
administrators.93 The Departments emphasized that they wanted to hear from “all
points of view on how to provide women access to the important preventive services
at issue without cost sharing while accommodating religious liberty interests.”94
In the ANPRM, the Departments stated that, “[o]n February 10, 2012, [they
made a] commit[ment] to working with stakeholders to develop alternative ways of
providing contraceptive coverage without cost sharing in order to accommodate nonexempt, non-profit religious organizations with religious objections to such
coverage.”95 The Departments indicated that, since the February 2012
announcement, they had met with representatives of various groups and stakeholders
to identify issues related to the accommodation.96 These consultations, in the
Departments’ words, “began to provide more detailed information on how health
coverage arrangements are currently structured, how religious accommodations work
in States with contraceptive coverage requirements, and the landscape with respect
to religious organizations that offer health benefits today.”97 They also gave the
following explanation for the extended comment period:
The 90-day comment period is designed to encourage maximum input
into the development of an accommodation for religious organizations
with religious objections to providing contraceptive coverage while
ensuring the availability of contraceptive coverage without cost sharing
for plan participants and beneficiaries. The Departments seek comments
on the ideas and questions outlined in this ANPRM as well as new
suggestions to achieve its goals. The Departments also intend to hold
listening sessions to ensure all voices are heard. This will not be the only
opportunity for comment. The subsequent notice of proposed rulemaking
89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id. at 16,504–05.
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Id. at 16,505–07.
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Id. at 16,504–08.
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Id. at 16,503.
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Id.
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Id.

97

Id.(emphasis added).
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will also include a public comment period. The Departments aim to
ensure that the final accommodation is fully vetted and published in
advance of the expiration of the temporary enforcement safe harbor.98
8. The February 2013 Proposed Rulemaking
In February 2013, the Departments issued proposed amendments to the rules
regarding coverage of certain preventive services.99 Unlike the method of rulemaking
used earlier to determine the coverage of preventive services and contraceptive
services,100 the Departments this time used the standard notice-and-comment
rulemaking process: They provided notice, requested comments from interested
persons on the proposed rules, set aside sixty days for the public to participate
meaningfully, and allowed time for the Departments to review and evaluate the
comments before finalizing and putting the rules into effect.101
In the regulatory materials, the Departments acknowledged receiving
approximately 200,000 comments from a variety of stakeholders in response to the
ANPRM.102 The commenters provided feedback regarding the religious-employer
exemption, the proposed accommodation, and other questions and issues raised by
the Departments.103 As to the religious-employer exemption, some commenters
expressed concern that the exemption was too narrow, and others argued that the
exemption should be broadened to bring it into alignment with conscience clauses
and exemptions in other federal laws and to avoid issues under the First Amendment
and RFRA.104 Other commenters stated that the exemption should not be broadened,
arguing that the mandate did not infringe on rights protected by the First
Amendment or RFRA.105 As to the accommodation, some commenters argued that it
failed to accommodate religious objections adequately and that, even with the
accommodation, plan sponsors would end up funding the coverage.106 Others argued
that the Departments should expand the accommodation to encompass a larger set of
organizations that object on moral or religious grounds, and some suggested criteria
used in other federal laws.107 Some commenters advocated for a narrow

98

Id. at 16,508.

99

See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed.
Reg. 8456 (Feb. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Proposed Rules].
100

See supra Parts II.B.1, II.B.4–5.

101

See Proposed Rules, supra note 99, at 8457. Comments were due on or before April 8,

2013.
102

Id. at 8459.

103

Id. at 8459–60.

104

Id. at 8459.

105

Id.

106

Id. Some commenters urged the Departments to rescind the mandate, provide an
exemption to any organization that objected to contraceptive services on religious or moral
grounds, or provide government funding for the contraceptive services. Id.
107

Id. at 8459–460.
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accommodation, arguing that the Departments should not expand the
accommodation to other types of organizations.108
The Departments proposed amending the existing rules in two respects. First, the
proposed rules would amend the authorization granted to HRSA to exempt group
health plans that are established or maintained by certain religious employers with
respect to the requirement to cover contraceptive services.109 This first modification
would adjust the qualifying criteria for the religious-employer exemption.110
Accordingly, the Departments proposed eliminating the first three criteria from the
existing rules and retaining the fourth as the definition of religious employer.111 In
the Departments’ view, this approach would avoid inquiry into the purposes and the
religious beliefs of employers and employees and limit the scope of the exemption to
churches, synagogues, mosques, other houses of worship, and religious orders as the
Departments’ exemption contemplated when the final rules were issued in 2012.112
Second, the Departments would provide accommodations to group health plans
established or maintained by eligible organizations, including student health
insurance coverage arranged by eligible religious institutions of higher education.113
In proposing the accommodations, the Departments specified criteria for determining
the eligibility of organizations and a process for organizations to self-certify their
qualification for an accommodation.114 In order to ensure that women would receive
contraceptive coverage without cost sharing, the Departments proposed means by
which participants and beneficiaries would be enrolled and provided coverage by
health insurance issuers independent of the objecting organizations.115 The
Departments’ goal for the proposed rules was to safeguard coverage while protecting
“eligible organizations from having to contract, arrange, pay or refer for
contraceptive coverage to which they object on religious grounds.”116
9. The July 2013 Final Rulemaking
In July 2013, the Departments issued their final rules regarding coverage of
certain preventive services.117 These rules went into effect on August 1, 2013, and
they applied to group health plans and health insurance issuers for plan years
beginning on or after January 1, 2014.118 The amendments to the religious-employer
exemption applied to plans and issuers beginning on or after August 1, 2013.119
108

Id. at 8460.
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Id. at 8456–457, 8460.
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See id. at 8459–460.
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Id. at 8461.
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Id.
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Id. at 8457–460.
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Id. at 8462.
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Id. at 8462–464.
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Id. at 8462.
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The Departments reported receiving over 400,000 comments in response to the
proposed rules, and they indicated that they considered these comments before
issuing the final rules.120 Some of the arguments advanced by commentators were
that contraceptive services do not prevent disease, that some are harmful to women,
and that they should not be considered preventive health services.121 The
Departments responded that the HRSA guidelines “are based on recommendations of
the independent [IOM Committee], which undertook a review of the scientific and
medical evidence on women’s preventive services.”122 The Departments reiterated
some of the same reasons identified in the regulatory materials accompanying their
February 2012 final rules, but this time they added that contraceptives, by reducing
the number of unintended pregnancies, would reduce the number of women seeking
abortions.123 The Departments also responded to a wide range of comments
regarding the religious-employer exemption and the accommodations.124
In the regulatory materials accompanying these final rules, the Departments gave
RFRA and the First Amendment more substantial consideration than in prior
rulemakings.125 Their consideration, however, extended only to matters involving
religious employers and certain non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations.126
The Departments expressed their view that the accommodations do not violate
RFRA and that the religious-employer exemption and accommodations violate
neither the Establishment Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.127 Finally, they asserted that the FDA-approved contraceptive methods,
which include Plan B, Ella, and IUDs, are not abortifacient within the meaning of
federal law and do not violate federal restrictions relating to abortion.128
In these final rules, the Administration completed its rulemaking on the mandate,
finalizing the rules on two remaining issues.129 First, the Administration modified the
religious-employer definition for purposes of the exemption.130 Under the final rules,
a “religious employer” is “an organization that is organized and operates as a
nonprofit entity and is referred to in section 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.”131
Second, the Administration provided accommodations for group health plans that
are established or maintained by eligible nonprofit religious organizations and for
120
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Id. at 39,886.
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student health insurance coverage arranged by eligible organizations that are
institutions of higher education.132 Under the final rules, an organization has to meet
the following criteria to be eligible for an accommodation:
(1) It has to oppose providing coverage for some or all of the mandated
contraceptive services on account of religious objections;
(2) It has to be organized and operate as a nonprofit entity;
(3) It has to hold itself out as a religious organization; and
(4) It has to self-certify (on a specified form) that it satisfies the first three
requirements.133
The rules also impose specific requirements on insurance issuers that have
received a self-certification from an eligible organization.134 They must expressly
exclude contraceptive coverage from the group plan coverage and provide separate
payments for any services that coverage is required for.135 Additionally, they must
segregate premium revenue collected from an eligible organization from monies
used to provide payment for contraceptive services, and they must provide notice to
participants and beneficiaries of the availability of separate coverage. 136
10. The June 2013 Guidance Documents
In June 2013, contemporaneous with the issuance of the final rules, the
Administration issued two additional guidance documents. The first document
extended the temporary enforcement safe harbor to encompass plan years beginning
on or after August 1, 2013, and before January 1, 2014.137 The second was a selfcertification form for organizations seeking an accommodation under the final rules
to execute.138
C. Some Observations Regarding the Processes Used to Develop the Mandate
As the preceding review of the regulatory actions that implemented the mandate
shows, the important policy decision to include contraceptive methods, sterilization
procedures, and patient education and counseling within the preventive health
services that must be covered without cost sharing was not made by the duly-elected
132

Id. at 39,873–82.
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Id. at 39,892.
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Id. at 39,893, 39,895–96.
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Id.
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Id. at 39,893, 39,895–97.

137 Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight (CCIIO), Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs. (CMS), Guidance on the Temporary Enforcement Safe Harbor for Certain Employers,
Group Health Plans and Group Health Insurance Issuers with Respect to the Requirement to
Cover Contraceptive Services Without Cost Sharing Under Section 2713 of the Public Health
Service Act, Section 715(a)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and Section
9815(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, CMS.GOV (June 28, 2013), https://www.cms.gov/
CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-Guidance/Downloads/preventive-services-guidance-6-282013.pdf.
138 Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Self
Certification Form, CMS.GOV (June 28, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/FormsReports-and-Other-Resources/index.html#Prevention.
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representatives of the American people serving in the U.S. Congress. In the ACA,
Congress had not defined what would be included within the coverage package of
preventive health services for women. Instead, it gave that decision-making
responsibility to the executive branch, and consequently the decision was made by
individuals within the Administration.
The Departments chose to use truncated administrative rulemaking procedures to
promulgate the mandate. By using the interim final rulemaking process, the
Administration hindered meaningful public participation, hampered dialogue
between policymakers and interested individuals and organizations, and prevented
full vetting of the rules before they went into effect. In other words, the regulatory
procedures chosen by the Administration thwarted what is supposed to be a
transparent, deliberative rulemaking process in which the public has the opportunity
to participate meaningfully. Consequently, the public’s interest in meaningful
participation in administrative rulemaking and its interest in transparent, deliberative
policy decision-making were not well served by the processes employed by the
Administration to develop and impose the mandate.
In the February/March 2012 timeframe, the Administration appeared to shift its
approach to rulemaking regarding the mandate.139 In the March 2012 ANPRM, the
Departments stated that they committed on February 10, 2012 (when they issued the
“final-final rules” approving the amended interim final rules, the mandate, and the
narrow religious-employer exemption) to working with stakeholders to ensure the
provision of contraceptive coverage without cost sharing while accommodating
certain nonprofit religious organizations that were opposed to providing the
mandated coverage on religious grounds. That shift is also signaled by the
Departments’ transition from using interim final rulemaking to the regular noticeand-comment rulemaking process and their explanation of why they were issuing an
ANPRM and providing for an extended comment period and listening sessions
before issuing a subsequent proposed rulemaking and providing an additional
opportunity to comment. In other words, from the February/March 2012 timeframe
forward, the Departments manifested a willingness to permit meaningful public
participation in rulemaking and the full vetting of the rules. However, at that point,
the Department had already developed and promulgated the mandate. The only
remaining issues were how narrow the religious-employer exemption would be, what
sort of accommodations would be extended to certain non-exempt, nonprofit
religious organizations, and how the accommodations would be administered.
A review of the Departments’ rulemaking activities shows that, once the
Administration had succeeded in establishing the mandate and thereby
accomplishing its key social and political objectives, it slowed the rulemaking
process down and began to employ standard procedures to allow public participation
in decisions regarding the scope of the religious-employer exemption and the
accommodation for nonprofit, religious organizations. In other words, when the
Administration turned its attention to accommodating religious beliefs and
conscience objections, it decided to take its time and give the public (including those
opposed to a religious-employer exemption and any accommodation of nonprofit
139

The year 2012 was a presidential election year, and the contraceptive coverage mandate
had become a contentious issue. See Devin Dwyer, Poll: Americans Divided over
Contraception Mandate, ABC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/
politics/2012/02/poll-americans-divided-over-contraception-mandate/.
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institutions) a full opportunity to comment on agency proposals. Considering that
2012 was an election year, the shift would allow the Administration to employ the
rhetoric of accommodation and public participation and to trumpet its work with
stakeholders, the listening sessions, and the full vetting of its rules.
The United States Supreme Court’s determination that the Administration’s
mandate violates the RFRA was issued after the promulgation of rules and actions
studied here, and its decision has necessitated additional rulemaking by the
Departments.140 Accordingly, on August 27, 2014, four years after they issued their
first set of interim final rules, the Departments issued more rules related to the
mandate.141 The Departments issued their new rules for nonprofit organizations as
interim final rules, setting the effective date as August 27, 2014, and requiring that
comments be received by October 27, 2014.142 They issued their new rules for forprofit organizations as proposed rules, and they specified that comments must be
received on or before October 21, 2014, to be considered.143
III. ANALYSIS UNDER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
In promulgating the mandate, the Departments undertook to create a “positive
right” or entitlement to coverage of all FDA-approved contraceptive methods,
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling.144 In creating this
140

See infra Part III.

141 See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 79 Fed.
Reg. 51,092 (Aug. 27, 2014) [hereinafter August 2014 Interim Final Rules]; 79 Fed. Reg.
51,118 [hereinafter August 2014 Proposed Rules]. An analysis of these new rules would
extend this Article beyond the scope of the study undertaken here, which has focused on the
rules up to their final form in July 2013. Additionally, these new rules were issued as this
Article was being finalized for publication.
142

August 2014 Interim Final Rules, supra note 141, at 51,092.

143

August 2014 Proposed Rules, supra note 141, at 51,119.

144

Id. at 51,121. Philosopher Isaiah Berlin is typically credited with recognizing the basic
distinction between negative rights or liberties and positive rights or liberties. See Isaiah
Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). As conventionally
understood, the concept of negative rights entails freedom or protection from government
action or interference (e.g., the freedom of religion and speech), and the concept of positive
rights entails entitlement to government action or support (e.g., the right to education). See
Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2272 (1990)
(“No inquiry is more central to constitutional jurisprudence than the effort to delineate the
duties of government. The courts’ approach to this complex subject has been dominated by
reliance on a simple distinction between affirmative and negative responsibilities. Government
is held solely to what courts characterize as a negative obligation: to refrain from acts that
deprive citizens of protected rights. Obligations that courts conceive to be affirmative—duties
to act, to provide, or to protect—are not enforceable constitutional rights.”); Mark Tushnet, An
Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1364, 1392 (1984) (“Part of the conventional wisdom
about rights distinguishes between negative rights—to be free from interference—and positive
rights to have various things. People sympathetic to the party of humanity [(i.e., ‘progressive
social forces’)] usually agree that the present balance between negative and positive rights is
askew and that we should strengthen or create positive rights while preserving most of our
negative rights. Yet, viewed pragmatically, it may be impossible to carry out that program. In
our culture, the image of negative rights overshadows that of positive ones and may obstruct
the expansion of positive rights.”). Courts have also recognized this distinction. See DeShaney
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positive right, however, the federal government did not assume the affirmative
responsibility of providing or paying for the coverage. Rather, under the ACA and
the Administration’s rules, the federal government required group health plans,
health insurance issuers, and employers to take action or provide support by making
them responsible for providing services prescribed by a health care provider and
used by the patient.145 In other words, the Administration made third parties to health
care provider-patient relationships responsible for the entitlement of patients by
requiring them to pay for the services.146
More than 300 individuals and entities filed over 100 cases challenging the
mandate and the burden the Administration placed upon them to pay for these
services.147 Almost an equal number of cases have been brought by for-profit
organizations as by nonprofit organizations.148 In these challenges, the litigants have
argued that they are opposed on religious and moral grounds to the federal
government requiring them to pay for certain specified services to which they object
on religious and moral grounds.149 Among the principal claims alleged by the
plaintiffs in these cases are claims under the First Amendment and RFRA.150
These challenges focus attention on the conflict the Administration precipitated
between the positive right to contraceptive coverage created by its regulatory rule
and the negative right of religious freedom recognized in the First Amendment and
reinforced in RFRA, which afford protection from government interference.151 As
the discussion above and below shows, the Departments failed to consider the First
Amendment and RFRA until after they had developed and imposed the mandate, and
when they did finally consider the First Amendment and RFRA, it was only in the
context of their narrow religious-employer exemption and their narrow
accommodations for certain non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations with
religious objections to paying for the services.152 The Administration’s failure to
consider the application of the First Amendment and RFRA left the mandate
v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1989); id. at 204 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Slade v. Bd. of Sch. Dir. of City of Milwaukee, 702 F.3d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir.
2012).
145 See August 2014 Proposed Rules, supra note 141, at 51,122. For a discussion of the
statutory and regulatory developments that led to the mandate, see infra Part II.
146

The third-party payment structure is an established part of health care financing in the
United States. See Thomas Bodenheimer & Kevin Grumbach, Paying for Health Care, 272
JAMA 634 (Aug. 24, 1994).
147 See HHS Mandate Information Central, THE BECKET FUND,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
148

See id.

149 See, e.g., Eternal World Television Network, Inc. v. Burwell, 756 F.3d 1339, 1348 (11th
Cir. 2014); Nebraska ex rel. Bruning v. Sebelius, 877 F.Supp. 2d 777, 788 (D. Neb. 2012).
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Eternal World Television Network, 756 F.3d at 1348 (“The Network alleged that the
mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the First Amendment, the Fifth
Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act.”); Sebelius, 877 F.Supp. 2d at 788
(alleging violations of the First Amendment and RFRA).
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See supra note 144 and sources cited therein.
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See supra Part II.B; infra Part III.A.
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vulnerable to challenge, and the RFRA claim ultimately succeeded because
Congress, in RFRA, had required the federal government to meet a high standard to
justify burdens it places on the negative right of religious freedom.153
The RFRA analysis performed here proceeds by first evaluating the
Departments’ consideration of (and failure to consider) RFRA in their rulemakings.
It then outlines the test established by Congress in RFRA and studies the Supreme
Court’s recent ruling that the mandate violates RFRA. The analysis concludes with a
brief, selective survey of other challenges to the mandate.
A. The Departments’ Rulemakings
During the course of their rulemakings, the Departments failed to give adequate
consideration to religious freedom and the requirements of the First Amendment and
RFRA. The Departments did not consider the First Amendment or RFRA at any
point in the interim final rules or in the regulatory materials accompanying the rules
issued in July 2010.154 Likewise, the Departments considered neither the First
Amendment nor RFRA at any point in the amended interim final rules or in the
regulatory materials accompanying the rules issued in August 2011.155
By the time of the August 2011 rulemaking, the Administration’s mandate that
group health plans, health insurance issuers, and many employers cover all FDAapproved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and
counseling was approved and in place.156 In that rulemaking, the Departments
indicated that they had received comments from the public and interested persons as
to their July 2010 interim final rules that raised concerns regarding religious
institutions, and in response to those comments, they authorized HRSA to establish a
religious-employer exemption and promulgated a definition of religious employers
that governed the scope of that exemption.157 And, yet, despite their acknowledged
awareness that their rules raised concerns for religious institutions, the Departments
did not analyze their regulatory action under the First Amendment or RFRA or
evaluate how the First Amendment or RFRA applied to their actions and the burdens
they were imposing on any nonprofit organizations, religious institutions, or forprofit organizations.
The Departments first considered the potential application of the First
Amendment and RFRA in February 2012 when they adopted their July 2010 interim
final rules and August 2011 amended interim final rules as final rules without
change.158 In those final-final rules, the Departments announced the one-year
153

See infra Part III.B.

154 See supra Part II.B.1. Considering Planned Parenthood’s contemporaneous
announcement of its campaign to include all-FDA approved contraceptives in HRSA’s
Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines and HHS’s representation that these guidelines were
already in development, the Departments cannot reasonably argue that the controversy
surrounding the mandate was not foreseeable. See Part II.B.1.
155

See supra Part II.B.4.

156

See supra Parts II.B.2–4. Additionally, neither the Committee that recommended
coverage of these services nor HRSA that issued the Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines
considered the application of the First Amendment and RFRA.
157

See supra Part II.B.4.

158

See supra Part II.B.5.
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enforcement safe harbor for certain non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations
with religious objections, and their plan to develop accommodations for such
organizations.159 Their consideration of the First Amendment and RFRA was,
however, limited in scope, focusing on their approach of providing a narrow
religious-employer exemption, creating the temporary enforcement safe harbor, and
developing some narrowly defined accommodations.160
Furthermore, although the Departments considered the First Amendment and
RFRA in their February 2012 rulemaking, their consideration was superficial and
conclusory.161 As to the First Amendment, the Departments asserted that the mandate
was “generally applicable and designed to serve the compelling public health and
gender equity goals described” in the regulatory materials and that the mandate “is in
no way specifically targeted at religion or religious practices.”162 The Departments’
consideration of RFRA was even more cursory: “[the Departments’] approach
complies with [RFRA], which generally requires a federal law to not substantially
burden religious exercise, or, if it does substantially burden religious exercise, to be
the least restrictive means to further a compelling government interest.”163 In the
regulatory materials accompanying their final-final rules, the Departments provided
no further discussion of the constitutional and statutory standards or contemplated
any alternative means of promoting their stated interests.164
In their July 2013 rulemaking, nearly two full years after the mandate was firmly
in place, the Departments finally gave something more than passing consideration to
some religious freedom issues created by the mandate.165 In that nearly two-year
period, commenters on the rules had raised concerns regarding religious freedom,
conscience, and moral objections to abortion and contraceptives.166 Additionally,
litigation had been instituted as early as November and December 2011,167 just a few
months after the contraceptive mandate was in place in August 2011, and those cases
presented claims under the First Amendment and RFRA.168 Both Planned
Parenthood and the USCCB had publicly expressed opposing views on the mandate
and communicated with the Administration.169 Furthermore, the HHS-funded IOM
159

See supra Part II.B.5.

160

See supra Part II.B.5.

161

See supra Part II.B.5.
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See Final Rules, supra note 59, at 8729. In this same paragraph, the Departments recited
aspects of the applicable constitutional standard: “The Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion is not violated by a law that is not specifically
targeted at religiously motived conduct and that applies equally to conduct without regard to
whether it is religiously motivated—a so-called neutral law of general applicability.” Id.
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See id. at 8725–30.
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See Amended Interim Final Rules, supra note 43, at 46,623–24; Final Rules, supra note
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Committee had given representatives of such groups as Planned Parenthood, the
Guttmacher Institute, and the National Women’s Law Center opportunity to shape
the views of Committee members on the issues, influence the development of its
recommendation, and help build “the record” that the Departments would rely on in
their rulemaking.170
In the July 2013 rulemaking, the Departments’ consideration of the First
Amendment and RFRA was focused on the exemption and the proposed
accommodations.171 In the regulatory materials, the Departments expressed their
belief that the exemption and the accommodations did not violate the Establishment
Clause because they were available on an equal basis to any and all religions.172
Likewise, in their view, the exemption and the accommodations did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause because they were neutral and generally applicable, did not
target religiously motivated conduct, and served to accommodate religion, not to
disfavor it.173
As to RFRA, the Departments expressed their view that accommodations were
not required by RFRA.174 Additionally, in their view, “the accommodations” did not
violate RFRA for several reasons: (1) they did not substantially burden religious
exercise; (2) they served two compelling government interests, namely, safeguarding
public health by expanding access to and utilization of recommended preventive
services, and ensuring that women have equal access to health care services; and (3)
they were the least restrictive means to achieve those interests.175 The Departments
disagreed with commenters who expressed concern that, even with the
accommodations, their organizations were required to be involved in providing
coverage of objectionable services, to provide the self-certification, and to fund or
subsidize coverage, and they disputed the claims of commenters who argued that
alternative means were available.176
At no point in these rulemakings did the Departments evaluate the application of
the First Amendment or RFRA to the burdens the mandate imposed on the religious
freedom and consciences of for-profit organizations and the individuals who own
them. Similarly, at no point in these rulemakings did the Department consider
carefully under RFRA questions regarding the scope of the religious-employer
exemption. Furthermore, as shown above, what consideration the Departments did
give to religious freedom and moral objections to the mandate was late and
insufficient to address those concerns meaningfully.
B. The RFRA Standard
During the period when the Departments were developing and finalizing the
mandate, RFRA provided one of the primary standards for evaluating whether and
170

See supra Part II.B.2.

171

See July 2013 Final Rules, supra note 17, at 39,886–88.
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See id. at 39,888.
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under what circumstances the federal government may impose a specific burden on
religious freedom. In 1993, Congress passed RFRA, and President Clinton signed it
into law.177 In passing this legislation, Congress acted with virtual unanimity in
response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Employment Division v. Smith.178 In Smith,
the Court had held that, under the First Amendment, neutral, generally applicable
laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling
governmental interest.179
In RFRA, Congress mandated broad protection for religious liberty, and this is
reflected in the legislative findings. Congress found that the free exercise of religion
is an unalienable right protected in the First Amendment and that religious exercise
is burdened by “laws ‘neutral’ toward religion . . . as surely as laws intended to
interfere with religious exercise.”180 According to Congress, the government must
have a compelling interest to substantially burden religious exercise, and the Court in
Smith had “virtually eliminated the requirement that the government [must] justify
burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion.”181 Congress
deemed the compelling interest standard “a workable test” for striking “sensible
balances” between religious liberty and governmental interests.182 In enacting RFRA,
Congress was motivated by two purposes: (1) restoring the compelling interest test
that the Court approved in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder, and requiring
its application in all cases where the free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened; and (2) providing a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is
substantially burdened by government.183
Accordingly, under RFRA, the federal government may “not substantially burden
a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability,” except when it meets two requirements.184 When the government’s
action substantially burdens religious exercise, it must demonstrate that the burden
(1) promotes a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that interest.185 RFRA defines “exercise of religion” and
“religious exercise” broadly to include “any exercise of religion whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”186

177

Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.
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See Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

179

See id. at 877–90. See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997)
(discussing Smith)
180

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (2012).
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Under RFRA, a person whose religious exercise is burdened may bring a claim
asserting a violation of RFRA and obtain appropriate relief.187 The religious claimant
must establish a prima facie case by showing the following: (1) a burdened practice
is an exercise of religion; (2) the burdened religious practice is sincere; and (3) the
burden is substantial.188 The federal government then carries the burden of proof and
must demonstrate that its application of the law (1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive means of achieving that
interest.189
As noted earlier, the Departments did not consider the application of this
standard to their mandate in the July 2010 rulemaking or the August 2011
rulemaking.190 Even in the February 2012 rulemaking, when they finalized without
any change their interim final rules, they did not apply this standard—they merely
recited it.191 The Departments did not apply this standard to the mandate until the
July 2013 rulemaking when they completed their rulemaking on the mandate; but,
even then, the Departments’ consideration of the standard was focused on the
accommodations.192 At no point during the three-year history of their rulemakings on
the mandate did the Departments consider the application of this standard to their
requirement that for-profit organizations provide the mandated coverage.193 Thus, the
for-profit litigants who challenged the mandate and the courts that heard those
challenges performed an analysis under RFRA that the Departments themselves had
failed to perform in their rulemakings.194
C. The Supreme Court’s Ruling
On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its ruling holding that the
Administration’s mandate violated RFRA.195 The specific question decided by the
187 Id. § 2000bb-1(c). Under RFRA, standing is determined “by the general rules of
standing under article III of the Constitution.” Id.
188 Cf. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428
(2006).
189

42 U.S.C § 2000bb-1(b). Under RFRA, “demonstrates” means “meets the burdens of
going forward with the evidence and of persuasion.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(3) (2000).
190

See supra Part III.A.

191

See supra Parts II.B.5, III.A.

192

See supra Part III.A.
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For a more extensive review of this rulemaking making history, see supra Parts II.B,

III.A.
194 Even if the Departments believed that for-profit entities are not persons under RFRA,
the RFRA analysis would still be warranted to give the public a rational explanation for their
decisions in the rulemaking. More importantly, the question whether for-profit entities are
persons under RFRA was at least a debatable issue, and the Departments were not warranted
in assuming they were not.
195

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2758 (2014), aff’g Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), and rev’g and remanding Conestoga
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013). Justice Kennedy concurred
in the Court’s opinion, but wrote a separate concurring opinion. He emphasized that the
Court’s opinion is premised upon “its assumption” that the government has “a legitimate and

2015]

LEGISLATING MORALITY PROGRESSIVELY

91

Court was whether RFRA permits HHS “to demand that three closely held
corporations provide health-insurance coverage for methods of contraception that
violate the sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies’ owners.”196
The Court determined that for-profit corporations (and individuals like the
Greens and the Hahns who own and control them) are persons under RFRA and that
protecting the religious freedom of corporations protects the religious freedom of the
individuals who own and control them.197 According to the Court, in RFRA,
Congress did not discriminate against owners of companies who desire to operate
their businesses in a manner required by their religious beliefs when they decide to
organize their businesses as corporations, as opposed to sole proprietorships or
general partnerships.198 Accordingly, federal regulations that restrict the activities of
for-profit closely-held corporations must conform to the requirements of RFRA.199
As to the prima facie case that the companies had to show, the Court determined
that the mandate substantially burdens religious exercise.200 The Court explained that
the Greens and the Hahns sincerely believe that life begins at conception, that they
object to providing health insurance that covers methods that may result in the
destruction of an embryo, and that the mandate requires them to “engage in conduct
that seriously violates their religious beliefs.”201 Finally, if the Greens and the Hahns
compelling interest in the health of female employees” but that the government has failed to
show that it is using the least restrictive means, especially considering that the government
had allowed a seemingly workable accommodation for other organizations that object on
religious grounds. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S.Ct. at 2786. He also observed that the
government has available to it the means of reconciling “two priorities”: “no person may be
restricted or demeaned by government in exercising his or her religion,” and “that same
exercise [may not] unduly restrict other persons, such as employees, in protecting their own
interests, interests the law deems compelling.” Id. at 2786–87.
Justice Ginsburg dissented and wrote an opinion that Justice Sotomayor joined in its
entirety and that Justices Breyer and Kagan joined as to all but Part III-C-1. Justice Ginsburg
expressed concern that the Court’s decision was startlingly broad, allowing “commercial
enterprises, including corporations, along with partnerships and sole proprietorships, [to] opt
out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held
religious beliefs.” Id. at 2787. In her view, any free exercise claim under the First Amendment
is foreclosed by Employment Division v. Smith because the mandate applies generally, is
aimed at the wellbeing of women, and would at most have an incidental effect on religious
exercise. Id. at 2790. Additionally, Justice Ginsburg understood the RFRA claim to fail on
every element: for-profit corporations do not exercise religion and thus do not qualify as
persons under RFRA for purposes of an exemption from the law; the mandate does not
substantially burden the religious exercise of the corporations or the families; the government
has shown that its interests in public health and the wellbeing of women are compelling; and
the government has shown that there is no less restrictive, equally effective means to satisfy
the religious objections and carry out the objective in the mandate. Id. at 2793–2803.
196
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(and their companies) fail to comply with the government’s mandate, the Court
observed, they will suffer serious economic consequences from the penalties
imposed by the government.202 The Court thus determined that the government’s
mandate, coupled with its coercive power to enforce the mandate by imposing
substantial penalties, substantially burdens religious freedom.
As to the government’s showing under RFRA, the Court assumed without
deciding that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged
contraceptive methods is compelling, and the Court then turned to the question of the
least restrictive means of furthering that interest.203 The Court observed that the
government itself could assume the cost of providing the four objectionable
contraceptive methods and that the government had not shown that that alternative
was not viable, especially considering that the ACA’s insurance-coverage provisions
will require the government to assume over $1.3 trillion in costs over the next
decade.204 The Court added: “If, as HHS tells us, providing all women with cost-free
access to all FDA-approved methods of contraception is a Government interest of
the highest order, it is hard to understand HHS’s argument that it cannot be required
under RFRA to pay anything in order to achieve this important goal.”205 But, in the
Court’s view, it was the Administration’s accommodation of nonprofit organizations
with religious objections that most clearly demonstrated the availability of a less
restrictive alternative.206 Thus, the Court determined that the federal government had
failed to carry its burden of showing that the mandate is the least restrictive means of
furthering the government’s interest. The mandate was found, as a result, to violate
RFRA as applied to closely-held corporations.207
D. Other Challenges
In the cases brought by Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties,
the Supreme Court determined that the mandate violates RFRA as applied to closelyheld for-profit corporations. Dozens of cases filed by nonprofit organizations remain
pending.208 In Wheaton College v. Burwell, the Court issued an order on the religious
nonprofit college’s application for injunction pending appeal.209 The Court enjoined
the government from enforcing against Wheaton College “the challenged provisions
of the [ACA] and related regulations pending final disposition of appellate review,”
if the college notifies HHS in writing that “it is a nonprofit organization that holds
itself out as religious and has religious objections to providing coverage for
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See id. at 2775–76.
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See id. at 2779–80.
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See id. at 2780–81 (citing estimates by the Congressional Budget Office).
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Id. at 2781 (emphasis in original).
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See id. at 2781–82.

207 See id. at 2785. The Court concluded that it did not need to reach the First Amendment
free exercise claim because its decision on the statutory issue resolved the question. Id.
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See HHS Mandate Information Central, THE BECKET FUND,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
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Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).
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contraceptive services.”210 The college objected to providing its health insurance
issuer and third-party administrator notice of its objection, which would trigger the
obligation of the issuer and administrator to provide coverage.211 In Little Sisters of
the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, the Court had issued a similar order
enjoining the federal government from enforcing the mandate, and the Little Sisters
had likewise objected to completing the requisite form and sending copies to thirdparty administrators.212
On August 27, 2014, the Departments issued more interim final rules and
proposed rules regarding coverage of certain preventive services under the ACA.213
In the interim final rules, the Departments added to the existing rules based upon the
Court’s ruling in the Wheaton College case and provided an alternative process for
eligible organizations to provide notice of their religious objections to contraceptive
coverage.214 In the proposed rules, the Departments proposed changing the definition
of eligible organization in their rules based upon the Court’s ruling in the Hobby
Lobby Stores case.215
Given the number of pending cases, and the additional rulemakings by the
Departments, litigation challenging the mandate is likely to persist for some time. It
remains to be seen how the Court’s ruling in the Hobby Lobby Stores case will be
applied to other for-profit businesses and to the wide range of nonprofit
organizations and individuals challenging the mandate.
The mandate’s complicated regulatory history and the three years of litigation
challenging the mandate highlight fundamental failures in the Administration’s
approach to establishing the mandate through agency rulemaking. The Departments
chose to use the interim final rulemaking process that, while accelerating
rulemaking, restricted and delayed meaningful participation by the public, including
the participation of individuals and organizations adversely affected by the mandate.
The Departments’ choice to use this truncated rulemaking process hampered
deliberation and deprived them of feedback from the public that would have led to
more carefully reasoned rulemakings. Had the Departments chosen to use the
standard notice-and-comment rulemaking process, issues under the First
Amendment and RFRA would have likely come into focus earlier, and the
Departments could have addressed those issues earlier. As it was, the Departments
were years behind in performing the statutorily-required analysis under RFRA.
Moreover, in their rulemakings, they never performed the RFRA analysis as to the
burden their mandate imposed on for-profit organizations. Consequently, the
Departments invited trouble by leaving the performance of that analysis to litigants
and the courts.
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Id. at 2807.
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See id.
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See Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014).
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See August 2014 Interim Final Rules, supra note 141; August 2014 Proposed Rules,
supra note 141. See also supra Part II.C.
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See August 2014 Interim Final Rules, supra note 141, at 51,092.
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See August 2014 Proposed Rules, supra note 141, at 51,118.
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IV. ANALYSIS UNDER A PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY AND ETHICS FRAMEWORK
The contraceptive coverage mandate is a public health initiative. Consequently, a
public health policy and ethics analysis is warranted. The analysis performed here
employs a public health policy and ethics framework proposed by a team of
bioethicists and public health law and policy experts. This analysis begins with an
overview of that framework and then evaluates the Administration’s mandate under
the team’s proposed analytical structure.
A. The ACA, the Mandate, Public Health, and Social Justice
As discussed earlier, Congress in the ACA mandated that group health plans,
health insurance issuers, and many employers cover categories of preventive health
services with no cost sharing.216 In implementing these ACA provisions, the
Administration decided to include within the preventive health services coverage
package all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and
patient education and counseling.217 In mandating coverage of preventive health
services, which now includes contraceptive and sterilization services, Congress and
the Administration decided to make use of health plans, health insurance issuers, and
employers in the federal government’s effort to promote public health.218
The decision of Congress and the Administration to cast the mandate in the mold
of public health is significant. Health care and medicine are oriented primarily to
individuals.219 In health care, attention is centered on the physician-patient
216

See supra Part II.A.

217

See supra Part II.B.

218 See Michael J. DeBoer, Access Without Limits? Revisiting Barriers and Boundaries
After the Affordable Care Act, 4 CONN. L. REV. 1239, 1257–58 & n.65 (2012). See also John
D. Blum, The Naprapath in the Rainforest, 18 NEXUS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 3, 7–8 (2012–2013)
(“[T]he ACA contains an array of measures that are directed toward enhancement of
preventive and wellness services, and the Act marks a significant and deliberate foray into this
traditional area of public health. The efforts undertaken in the ACA concerning prevention
and wellness may be cast in a traditional biomedical model, but the efforts are certainly
reflective of governmental awareness that broader public health approaches, including
information awareness, clinical prevention, and workplace wellness, are critical for health
maintenance and potentially play important roles in containing costs of chronic illness.”); John
Aloysius Cogan, Jr., The Affordable Care Act’s Preventive Services Mandate: Breaking Down
the Barriers to Nationwide Access to Preventive Services, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 355, 355
(2011) (“By requiring . . . health plans to provide evidence-based preventive services with no
out-of-pocket costs, the ACA transforms the U.S.’s public and private health care financing
systems into vehicles for promoting public health.”); Lorian E. Hardcastle, et al., Improving
the Population’s Health: The Affordable Care Act and the Importance of Integration, 39 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 317, 322 (2011) (discussing insurance reforms in the ACA and major
provisions affecting public health and stating that another set of ACA reforms “addresses the
demand for public health services by eliminating barriers to preventive services. [Q]ualified
health plans can no longer impose costs on patients for services deemed beneficial by the
[USPSTF] or for immunizations recommended by the [ACIP]. Preventive care for infants,
children, adolescents, and women recommended by the [HRSA] will similarly be free of
charge.”).
219 See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 16 (2d ed.
2008).
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relationship, and in therapeutic relationships, physicians act in the best interests of
their patients, providing care to diagnose and treat injury and illness and to cure
disease.220 By contrast, public health focuses on populations and government efforts
to promote the health of populations and to prevent injury, illness, disease, and
disability.221 Consequently, in public health, the focus is not on the care of individual
patients.222 Public health has traditionally aimed to promote the common good
through government efforts to collect and analyze data and then intervene to prevent
and reduce risks and harms.223 Traditional public health activities included disease
surveillance, sanitation, injury prevention, and infectious disease control and
prevention.224 Through these and similar efforts, governments have sought to address
the underlying causes of disease and disability in populations.225
Over the last two decades, some public health experts and bioethicists have
advocated a broader, more comprehensive vision of public health and its mission.226
According to this vision, the mission of public health becomes a large, allencompassing endeavor to address a wide range of social, economic, and
environmental “determinants of health” and to ensure a fair allocation of
resources.227 Acting pursuant to this enlarged vision, progressives have undertaken to
use government power, including its power to coerce conduct, to change
socioeconomic conditions and restructure society.228
These progressives have assigned moral force to their agenda by appropriating
the language and values of social justice.229 For instance, Professor Lawrence O.
Gostin wrote:
Social justice is viewed as so central to the mission of public health that it
has been described as the field’s core value: “The historic dream of public
health . . . is a dream of social justice.” Among the most basic and
commonly understood meanings of justice is fair, equitable, and
220

See id.

221

See id. at 16–17, 19.

222

See id. at 17.
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See id. at 16–21.

224

See id. at 39.
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See id. The Institute of Medicine’s influential report in 1988 defined public health as
“what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions in which people can be
healthy.” INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1 (1988).
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See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2002); NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: A POPULATION VIEW
(2007); MADISON POWERS & RUTH FADEN, SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH POLICY (2006).
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GOSTIN, supra note 219, at 39–41.
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Id. at 21–23, 39–41. See also LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS:
A READER 4 (Lawrence O. Gostin, ed., University of California Press 2d ed. 2010) (“[Other
scholars and practitioners] prefer a broad focus on the socioeconomic foundations of health . .
. . This inclusive view of public health is gaining popularity.”).
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See, e.g., GOSTIN, supra note 219, at 21–23.
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appropriate treatment in light of what is due or owed to individuals and
groups.230
The pursuit of social justice can thus inspire ambitious programs and policies to
improve the health of populations and to ensure “fair” treatment by addressing
“persistent patterns of systematic disadvantage” and altering social and economic
conditions.231
Although contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures may be prescribed
for either medical or public health purposes,232 the Administration located the
contraceptive coverage mandate squarely within this broader progressive vision of
public health.233 As the regulatory materials indicate, the Departments intended the
mandate to further two large social goals: (1) public health and (2) gender equity.234
Furthermore, in the litigation before the Supreme Court, the Administration
defended the mandate on public health and gender equality grounds.235
Additionally, Professor Lawrence O. Gostin, one of the foremost experts on
public health law and policy in this country, framed the mandate as a public health
initiative and situated it within the context of this enlarged vision. In the Hobby
Lobby Stores litigation before the Supreme Court, Professor Gostin and other public
health and foreign and comparative law experts filed an amicus brief (the Gostin

230

Id. at 21 (quoting Dan E. Beauchamp, Public Health as Social Justice, in NEW ETHICS
Bonnie Steinbock, eds., 1999)

FOR THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 105-14 (Dan E. Beauchamp &
(citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 10 (1971)).
231

See GOSTIN, supra note 219, at 22.

232

See Blum, supra note 218, at 8.

233

The IOM Committee’s report reflects the public health orientation of the mandate as
well as the ACA’s preventive health services provisions. The Committee operated under the
IOM’s Board of Population Health and Public Health Practice. See CLOSING THE GAPS
REPORT, supra note 31. The Report stated:
The passage of the [ACA] provides the United States with an opportunity to offer an
unprecedented level of population health care coverage and dramatically reduce
existing health disparities. The expansion of coverage to millions of uninsured
Americans and the new standards for coverage of preventive services that are included
in the ACA have the potential to increase the use of preventive health care services
and screenings and in turn improve the health and well-being of individuals across the
United States.
Id. at 15.
234 In their February 2012 rulemaking, the Departments identified “public health and
gender equity” as the compelling interests served by the mandate. Final Rules, supra note 59,
at 8729. In their July 2013 rulemaking, they asserted that the mandate advanced the following
governmental interests: “safeguarding public health by expanding access to and utilization of
recommended preventive services for women,” and “assuring that women have equal access
to health care services.” July 2013 Final Rules, supra note 17, at 39,887. See also supra Parts
II.B.5, II.B.9.
235 See Brief for Respondent at 10, 42, 48, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1536 (2014) (No.13-356). See also supra Part III.
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Brief) supporting the government’s position.236 The Gostin Brief highlighted the
public health orientation of the mandate: “These cases present the questions whether
and to what extent for-profit corporations that claim religious objection to providing
health insurance plans that cover contraception can refuse to comply with a public
health law as a so-called conscientious objector.”237 The brief also argued that
contraceptive access is “an essential component of women’s human rights” and that
such access “may not be circumscribed by the assertion of religious convictions by
for-profit corporations.”238 According to the brief, the right of women to access
health care and family planning, including contraception, receives priority in foreign
law sources over a limited right of conscientious objection, and conscientious
objector rights are recognized only for individuals, not for-profit corporations.239
Although the Gostin Brief argued that these limitations on conscientious objection
comport with the Supreme Court’s religious freedom jurisprudence, the brief did not
cite or discuss RFRA or RFRA’s amplification of the negative right of religious
freedom that is recognized in the First Amendment.240
B. A Brief Overview of the Analytical Framework
Professor James F. Childress, Professor Gostin, and several colleagues in the
field of public health have observed that inadequate attention has been afforded to
certain concepts, methods, and boundaries in public health ethics.241 In an effort to
address that deficiency, they have offered “a conceptual map of the terrain of public
health ethics,” which includes a set of general moral considerations and a set of
justificatory conditions.242 The analysis here will use their framework to evaluate the
contraceptive coverage mandate as a public health initiative.

236 See Brief for Foreign and Comparative Law Experts Lawrence O. Gostin et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014)
(Nos. 13-354, 13-356).
237

Id. at *3.

238

Id. at *5.

239

Id. at *16–23, 30–34.

240

Id. at *28–30. The brief’s presentation of the Supreme Court’s religious freedom
jurisprudence is highly selective.
241

James F. Childress et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J. LAW, MED.
& ETHICS 170 (2002). The authors of this article are an impressive team. In addition to
Professors Childress and Gostin of the University of Virginia and Georgetown University
respectively, the team included: Ruth R. Faden (Johns Hopkins University); Ruth D. Gaare
(University of Virginia); Jeffrey Kahn (Johns Hopkins University); Richard J. Bonnie
(University of Virginia); Nancy E. Kass (Johns Hopkins University); Anna C. Mastroianni
(University of Washington); Jonathan D. Moreno (University of Pennsylvania); and Phillip
Nieburg (Center for Strategic and International Studies).
242

See id. at 170. Childress and his colleagues also referred to what they have proposed as
“a framework.” Id. at 177. In his book Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, Professor
Gostin has offered another framework for systematically evaluating public health regulations.
See GOSTIN, supra note 219, at 43–74.
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The General Moral Considerations

In their framework, Childress and his colleagues began with the recognition that
government has a duty to justify public health policies. They wrote: “In a liberal,
pluralistic democracy, the justification of coercive policies, as well as other policies,
must rest on moral reasons that the public in whose name the policies are carried out
could reasonably be expected to accept.”243 The general moral considerations,
“clusters of moral concepts and norms” that may be “variously called values,
principles, or rules,”244 provide concrete moral guidance in evaluating particular
public health policies, practices, and actions.245 They observed that public health
activities generally have a teleological and consequentialist orientation and that the
end is the public’s health.246 Consequently, utility-balancing factors prominently in
their analytical framework, as will be evident from the discussion that follows.247
a.

The Nine General Moral Considerations

Childress and his colleagues identified the following set of general moral
considerations for deliberating about and justifying particular public health policies,
practices, and actions:
(1) Benefits—whether the policy or activity produces benefits;
(2) Harms—whether the policy or activity avoids, prevents, and removes
harms;
(3) Utility—whether the policy or activity produces the maximal balance of
benefits over harms and other costs;
(4) Justice—whether the policy or activity distributes benefits and burdens
fairly (distributive justice) and results from a deliberative process that

243

Id. at 171.

244

Childress et al., supra note 241, at 171.

245

Id.

246

Id. at 170.

247

Childress and his colleagues are not alone in featuring utilitarianism as a centerpiece of
public health ethics. Professors Ronald Bayer and Amy L. Fairchild have argued that the
values of research ethics, medical ethics, and bioethics, such as individualism, autonomy, antipaternalism, privacy, and liberty, are fundamentally different from, and often in conflict with,
the values and practices of public health ethics and that public health is “[a]nimated by a
broad utilitarianism that seeks to maximize communal well-being.” Ronald Bayer & Amy L.
Fairchild, The Genesis of Public Health Ethics, 18 BIOETHICS 473, 491 (2004). David
Buchanan has observed that “public health has long been associated with the utilitarian school
of moral philosophy. Utilitarianism is essentially consequentialist in analyzing issues, holding
that the most ethically reasonable course of action is that which produces the greatest good for
the greatest number.” David R. Buchanan, Autonomy, Paternalism, and Justice: Ethical
Priorities in Public Health, 98 AM. J. OF PUBLIC HEALTH 15, 17 (2008). Daniel Callahan and
Bruce Jennings recognized the need for dialogue between public health and bioethics and the
challenges posed by “the tension produced by the predominant orientation of civil liberties
and individual autonomy that one finds in bioethics, as opposed to the utilitarian, paternalistic,
and communitarian orientations that have marked the field of public health throughout its
history.” Daniel Callahan & Bruce Jennings, Ethics and Public Health: Forging a Strong
Relationship, 92 AM. J. OF PUBLIC HEALTH 169, 170 (2002).
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ensured public participation, including the participation of affected parties
(procedural justice);
(5) Autonomy/liberty—whether the policy or activity respects autonomous
choices and actions, including liberty of action;
(6) Privacy/confidentiality—whether the policy or activity protects privacy and
confidentiality;
(7) Integrity—whether policymakers have kept promises and commitments;
(8) Transparency—whether policymakers have disclosed information and
spoken truthfully; and
(9) Trust—whether policymakers have built and maintained public trust.248
For Childress and his colleagues, these considerations constitute the moral
content of public health ethics, but the considerations need further specification as to
their meaning and scope.249 Moreover, each consideration provides guidance as to
the appropriateness of particular policies and activities. At times, they lend support
for particular policies or activities, and at other times, they counsel limitations.250
Additionally, some considerations may conflict with other considerations in the
context of particular policies or activities.251
b.

The Balancing of General Moral Considerations of Indeterminate Weight
or Strength

According to Childress and his colleagues, these general moral considerations are
not absolute, and they have no specific weight or strength.252 In particular instances,
some considerations may need to yield to other considerations.253 Additionally, when
considerations conflict, Childress and his colleagues prefer a balancing approach
based upon the unique situations and contexts encountered rather than an approach
of assigning priority status to certain considerations or determining their relative
weights in advance.254 Under this balancing approach, circumstances and contexts
are understood to affect the relative weights of the considerations.255
Although Childress and his colleagues eschew prioritizing considerations or
determining their relative weights in advance of a conflict, they view the first three
general moral considerations—producing benefits, preventing harms, and
maximizing utility—as providing “prima facie warrant” for public health
activities.256 Additionally, they single out justice, autonomy/liberty, and
privacy/confidentiality as “particularly noteworthy.”257 Nevertheless, in their view,
248

Childress et al., supra note 241, at 171–72.
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each of the general moral considerations provides guidance in the process of
evaluating and justifying particular public health policies and activities.
2.

The Justificatory Conditions

Childress and his colleagues proposed five justificatory conditions—
effectiveness, proportionality, necessity, least infringement, and public
justification—to resolve conflicts among the general moral considerations.258 They
focus primarily upon “conflict between the general moral considerations that are
generally taken to instantiate the goal of public health—producing benefits,
preventing harms, and maximizing utility—and those that express other moral
commitments.”259 These justificatory conditions, they thought, could help determine
“whether promoting public health warrants overriding” other considerations and
values.260
Their five proposed justificatory conditions include some specific requirements:
(1) Effectiveness: Proponents of a particular public health policy or activity
that infringes one or more general moral considerations must show that the
proposed policy or activity will realize its goal and protect public health.
(2) Proportionality: Proponents must balance positive features and benefits
against negative features and undesirable consequences and show that
probable public health benefits outweigh infringed general moral
considerations.
(3) Necessity: Proponents must show that a policy or activity is necessary to
realize the public health goal and adopt an effective alternative that is less
problematic when available. Proponents of a coercive policy or activity
carry the burden of moral proof and must show that such an approach is
necessary.
(4) Least infringement: Proponents must seek to minimize infringement of
general moral considerations (a) by adopting the least restrictive or the least
intrusive alternative, (b) by restricting the scope of the policy to safeguard
threatened interests, and (c) by limiting the policy to the scope necessary to
achieve the public health goal.
(5) Public justification: Proponents must explain and justify any infringement
of one or more general moral considerations to the relevant parties,
including those adversely affected. In order to build and maintain public
trust and establish public accountability, proponents must allow affected
parties to provide input into the formulation of policy, and they must be
transparent by treating citizens as equals and with respect by offering moral
reasons that in principle they could find acceptable.261
C. An Application of the Analytical Framework
As of the July 2013 rulemaking, the Administration imposed the contraceptive
coverage mandate broadly on group health plans, health insurance issuers, and many
employers, providing only a narrow religious-employer exemption and narrowly258
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defined accommodations for non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations that
object on religious grounds.262 As of the time of that rulemaking, the Administration
did not exempt or accommodate any for-profit organizations that have religious or
moral objections.263
1.

The First Three General Moral Considerations

In their July 2010 rulemaking, the Departments discussed benefits, costs, and
transfers of costs associated with the coverage of preventive services without cost
sharing in general.264 They also discussed the estimated number of affected entities,
various types of anticipated benefits, and alternatives considered regarding the
rulemaking.265 In this rulemaking, the Departments mandated, with respect to
women, coverage of preventive care and screenings provided for in comprehensive
guidelines supported by HRSA.266 Those comprehensive guidelines regarding
preventive care and screening for women, the Departments announced, were under
development and expected no later than August 1, 2011.267 Consequently, in that
rulemaking, the Departments could not have evaluated the benefits, the harms, or the
utility of the contraceptive coverage mandate.
In July 2011, the IOM Committee issued its report recommending coverage of all
FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient
education and counseling.268 The Committee addressed scientific evidence related to
this recommendation in just eight pages of its 200-plus page report.269 The
Committee viewed unintended pregnancies (either unwanted or mistimed) as a harm
and prevention of unintended pregnancies as a benefit.270 The Committee discussed
the prevalence of unintended pregnancies and referenced documentation as to the
consequences of unintended pregnancy for the mother and the baby, but it
acknowledged that research is limited as to some outcomes.271 The Committee
reviewed reports and literature discussing consequences resulting from unintended
pregnancies, including breastfeeding patterns, depression, happiness, birth weight,
and premature birth, and it discussed contraindicated pregnancies.272 The Committee
also reviewed some data regarding the effectiveness of different contraceptive
methods and sterilization procedures in preventing or reducing pregnancies and
262
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Part II.C.
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abortion rates, and it cited the cost-effectiveness of contraception.273 The Committee
acknowledged both risks and benefits of contraceptive methods, including minimal
side effects and low death rates, and also noted therapeutic benefits.274 The
Committee then referenced coverage practices in private health insurance and public
insurance programs, discussing the impact of cost sharing on utilization.275
In his dissenting statement, Professor Lo Sasso, a health economics and health
policy expert, spoke specifically to the Committee’s flawed evaluation of evidence
and the risk of the Committee making “poorly informed decisions” because of the
unrealistic time constraints.276 He urged that the Committee recommend “no
additional preventive services beyond those explicitly stated in the [ACA] . . . until
such time as the evidence can be objectively and systematically evaluated and an
appropriate framework can be developed.”277 He was especially cognizant of the
“remarkably short time frame . . . for the task of reviewing all evidence for
preventive services beyond the services encompassed by [other specified entities or
projects].”278 He observed: “As the Report acknowledges, the lack of time prevented
a serious and systematic review of evidence for preventive services.”279 The
Committee erred, he thought, in its “zeal to recommend something despite the time
constraints and a far from perfect methodology.”280 For Lo Sasso, it was important
that readers of the report understand that “the recommendations were made without
high quality, systematic evidence of the preventive nature of the services
considered.”281 These deficiencies in the evidence evaluation process, he thought,
were “a fatal flaw of the Report particularly in light of the importance of the
recommendations for public policy and the number of individuals, both men and
women, [who] will be affected.”282
In addition to his concerns regarding the unrealistic time constraints and the
deficient evidence evaluation process, Lo Sasso expressed concern about “the lack of
a coherent framework to evaluate coverage apart from the evidence regarding
clinical efficacy.”283 Thus, for Lo Sasso, the Committee blurred the lines between
clinical recommendations and coverage decisions, failing to differentiate properly
among the materials they reviewed in terms of scientific weight.284
273
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question leads to lower rates of disability or disease and increased rates of well-being is
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Law Professor Helen M. Alvaré has carefully reviewed the empirical grounds
cited by the IOM Committee.285 Her assessment of the report and recommendation is
deeply critical: “the IOM’s argument [that free contraception, sterilization, and
[emergency contraceptives] are crucial for preserving women’s health] is poorly
sourced, poorly reasoned, biased, and incomplete with respect to the questions of
contraception and women’s health.”286 Her evaluation of the report concluded with
the following:
In sum, the IOM Report did not prove any of the following: that it used a reliable and
consistent measure of unintended pregnancy; that there is a relationship between
contraceptive usage and unintended pregnancy or abortion rates; that unintended
pregnancy causes poor health outcomes for women; that rates of contraceptive usage
are driven by cost; or that increasing usage among the objects of the Report—
employed women and the daughters of the employed—will affect rates of unintended
pregnancy which are highest among women already provided with free or low-cost
contraception from the government. The IOM Report also did not consider the several
categories of well-developed literature bearing on the subject of the links between
contraceptive usage and women’s health: physical side-effects of contraception; and
the social changes effected by dissociating sex from commitment and from
parenting.287

Soon after the IOM Committee issued its report, HRSA simply adopted the
Committee’s recommendations and issued its guidelines, which had the effect of
mandating the contraceptive coverage.288 There is no indication that HRSA
conducted any separate evaluation of benefits, harms, or utility.289 Likewise, in their
August 2011 rulemaking, the Departments did not evaluate the benefits, the harms,
or the utility of the contraceptive coverage mandate, and they asserted in conclusory
terms that they did not expect the amendment to the interim final rules to result in
any additional significant burden or costs to the affected entities.290 At the time of
this rulemaking, the Administration’s consideration of benefits, harms, and utility
was limited to its analysis in the July 2010 rulemaking, in which the Departments
could not have assessed benefits, harms, or utility of the contraceptive coverage
mandate because the guidelines had not been developed.291 Thus, as of August 2011,
the evaluation of benefits, harms, and utility was limited to the IOM Committee’s
deficient consideration.
The Departments’ most direct consideration of benefits occurred in their
February 2012 rulemaking.292 In this rulemaking, in which the Departments finalized
285

Alvaré, supra note 34, at 382–83.

286 Id. at 382. Professor Alvaré’s critical evaluation of the IOM Committee’s report is
comprehensive and lengthy. Id. at 391–431. This Article will not undertake to perform the
same critical evaluation of the IOM Committee’s report that her article does so well.
287

Id. at 431.
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See supra Part II.B.3.
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Amended Interim Final Rules, supra note 43, at 46,625. See supra Part II.B.4
(discussing the Departments’ August 2011 rulemaking).
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See supra Part II.B.1.
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See supra Part II.B.5 (discussing the February 2012 rulemaking).
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their interim final rules, they cited various benefits, drawing primarily on the IOM
Committee’s report.293 The Departments did not, however, discuss any harms, such
as side effects or other possible adverse consequences. As for utility, the
Departments relied upon Congress’s general policy that coverage of preventive
services is necessary to achieve basic health care coverage.294 In the Departments’
view, the unique health needs of women disadvantage them in the work force, and
access to contraception improves the socioeconomic status of women.295
Additionally, the Departments expressed their beliefs that cost sharing can be a
significant barrier to effective contraception and that providing women broad access
to preventive services and contraceptive services reduces gender disparities.296 In the
July 2013 rulemaking, the Departments conducted no analysis of benefits, harms, or
utility of the mandate.297
At no point in these rulemakings did the Departments engage in a careful
analysis of the benefits and the harms or the utility of including all FDA-approved
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and
counseling in the mandated package of preventive health services. Rather, the
Departments relied upon the IOM Committee to conduct whatever analysis would be
conducted as to the benefits, the harms, and the utility, but, as was discussed above,
the Committee’s analysis itself suffers from deficiencies. Additionally, throughout
these rulemakings and the development of the mandate, neither the Departments nor
the IOM Committee considered the harm to human embryos that can be caused by
some FDA-approved methods in some circumstances.298 Thus, the Administration
failed to make an adequate case for the mandate based upon a careful analysis of the
benefits, the harms, and the utility.
2.

The Other General Moral Considerations

Even if the Administration could adequately show that the first three general
moral considerations warranted its action in imposing the mandate on group health
plans, health insurance issuers, and many employers, analysis of the other general
moral considerations highlights additional problems with the mandate.299
a. Justice
While developing and implementing the mandate, the Administration considered
some of the justice implications of the mandate. In the February 2012 and July 2013
rulemakings, the Departments discussed the distribution of benefits and burdens
among men and women (distributive justice) and highlighted gender equity as one of
293

Final Rules, supra note 59, at 8727–28.

294

Id. at 8727.
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Id. at 8728.
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Id.
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See supra Part II.B.9 (discussing the Departments’ July 2013 rulemaking).
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For a discussion of the acknowledgments of the federal government and drug
manufacturers of the post-fertilization harm that can be caused by some FDA-approved
methods, see Alvaré, supra note 34, at 384 & n.21, 394–95 & nn.65–78.
299 Because the mandate does not appear to pose a serious privacy/confidentiality concern,
the analysis here does not explore that consideration.
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the principal interests they were seeking to promote by creating a positive right to
contraceptive coverage.300 Additionally, in various rulemakings, the Departments
identified burdens women bear in connection with pregnancies and childbearing, and
they listed perceived benefits associated with cost-free contraception and the
prevention of unintended pregnancies.301
The Administration did not, however, fully consider the concerns of justice
(including social justice) when it adopted the mandate. The fundamental principle of
justice is to give each person his or her due,302 and what justice requires for one
person cannot be determined without considering justice for others in society to
whom that person relates.303 Consequently, for the Administration to address justice
adequately as a general moral consideration, a broad analysis of what was due to
other persons and entities was also required, and without that broad analysis, the
Administration could not determine whether it was truly dispensing justice and
giving to each person his or her due. A circumspect assessment of justice would also
require evaluation of the effects the mandate would have on a wide range of
institutions in society, including the vast numbers of religious institutions, nonprofit
organizations, and businesses affected. The Administration’s consideration of
distributive justice was incomplete because it failed to consider carefully the burdens
it was placing upon the range of individuals and entities subject to the mandate.
Furthermore, the Administration was late in considering some burdens (i.e., burdens
on religious organizations, nonprofit organizations, and health insurers), and it failed
to consider other burdens entirely during the rulemakings (i.e., burdens on owners of
for-profit companies who object on religious and moral grounds to particular
contraceptive methods).304
As for procedural justice, the Administration decided to use procedures in
developing and imposing the mandate that failed to ensure meaningful public
participation, including the participation of affected parties. The Departments’
300

See supra Parts II.B.5 and II.B.9.

301

See supra Parts II.B.5 and II.B.9.
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See EMIL BRUNNER, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 23 (Mary Hottinger trans., 1945)
(“From time immemorial the principle of justice has been defined as the suum cuique—the
rendering to each man of his due.”). The maxim of Roman law suum cuique tribuere (give to
each his due), which for the Roman jurist Ulpian was one of the three basic principles of right,
expresses this understanding. 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 10 (Alan Watson ed., 1985). United
States Supreme Court Justice Stanley Matthews referred to this maxim as the “fundamental
maxim of distributive justice.” Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).
303 See Robert John Araujo, S.J., Our Debt to De Vitoria: A Catholic Foundation of Human
Rights, 10 AVE MARIA L. REV. 313, 317–18 (2012). He wrote:

In essence, the justice that is due someone or something relates to what is due others
with whom this person shares society and is therefore in relationship with other
persons. In other words, the justice for one cannot be determined until what is just—
what is proper, and what is improper—for others involved with the same question or
issue is considered and determined. In consequence, what is due one person cannot be
considered until what is due others who find themselves in the same context is
considered.
Id.
304

See supra Part III.A.
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decisions to use the interim final rulemaking processes in their July 2010 and August
2011 rulemakings and to claim exemptions from the regular notice-and-comment
rulemaking process did not comport with procedural justice.305 Additionally, the
Administration gave critical policymaking authority to the IOM Committee, but the
Committee’s process failed to ensure meaningful participation by the public and
interested persons and institutions.306 Both the Departments and the Committee could
have chosen procedures that would have ensured broader and more meaningful
participation, but they instead utilized processes that constricted and delayed the
public’s participation. As a result of the Departments’ selection of rulemaking
procedures, the mandate was in place upon HRSA’s issuance of guidelines on
August 1, 2011, before the Departments issued their first response to any of the
thousands of public comments submitted in response to their July 2010 interim final
rules.307
b. Autonomy/Liberty
In creating a positive right to contraceptive coverage, the Administration
infringed the negative rights of individuals, businesses, and nonprofit and religious
organizations under the First Amendment and RFRA.308 Additionally, by mandating
coverage of preventive health services and all FDA-approved contraceptive methods
and sterilization procedures, Congress and the Administration intruded upon the
autonomous choices and actions of individuals, businesses, nonprofit organizations,
and religious institutions.309 The Departments did not fully consider these
305

See supra Parts II.B.1 and II.B.4–5.

306

In six months, the Committee met five times and conducted three open sessions. See
supra Part II.B.2. Professor Alvaré has provided the following observation regarding the
stacking of committee membership and invited witnesses, which limited the participation of
affected persons:
At least nine of the sixteen panel members had close ties with the nation’s largest
provider of government-subsidized birth control, and the largest abortion provider,
Planned Parenthood—serving as members or even chairs of boards of directors of
various Planned Parenthood affiliates nationwide. They had recently donated over one
hundred thousand dollars to that organization. Others founded or worked directly for
other contraception and abortion advocacy groups. Invited witnesses included Planned
Parenthood, the abortion advocacy groups the National Women’s Law Center, and the
Guttmacher Institute. There was no representative on the panel, or as a witness, from
the leading private provider of health care to women in the United States: Catholic
health care services.
Alvaré, supra note 34, at 430–31. In addition to Catholic health care services, no
representative of other groups such as Americans United for Life, Concerned Women for
America, Family Research Council, and Physicians for Life was included on the panel or
invited to present at a committee meeting.
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See supra Parts II.B.3–5.
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See supra Part III (discussing the burden imposed on religious freedom).
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Professor Gostin has explained that “[a]utonomy, literally ‘self-governance,’ has
acquired meanings as diverse as liberty, privacy, individual choice, and even economic
freedom. . . . Autonomous persons are free to hold views, make choices, and take actions
based on personal values.” GOSTIN, supra note 219, at 48. Gostin has recognized that
government through regulation and public health activities interferes with the liberty and
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infringements in their rulemaking, and what consideration they did give these
infringements was years late.
c.

Integrity

Reproductive rights, birth control, abortion, and women’s freedom have been key
pieces of President Obama’s political activities, campaign promises, and policy
agenda.310 However, in November 2011, after the Departments’ first two
rulemakings, the IOM Committee’s release of its recommendations, and HRSA’s
issuance of its guidelines, President Obama called Archbishop Dolan, the USCCB
president, and invited him to meet to discuss issues related to the coverage of
preventive services.311 In his account of their 45-minute discussion, Dolan explained
that, at the conclusion of the meeting, he summarized the substance of the
President’s understanding as it had been conveyed to him:
I said, “I’ve heard you say, first of all, that you have immense regard for
the work of the Catholic Church in the United States in health care,
education and charity. . . . I have heard you say that you are not going to
let the administration do anything to impede that work and . . . that you
take the protection of the rights of conscience with the utmost seriousness.
. . . Does that accurately sum up our conversation?” [Mr. Obama] said,
“You bet it does.”312

autonomy of individuals and businesses to act in their own interests, constrains the rights of
individuals and businesses, and controls individuals and businesses “for the aggregate good.”
Id. at 10–11.
310

Alvaré, supra note 34, at 386–87. In her article on the mandate, Professor Alvaré
chronicled some of the President’s political associations and activities. Id. She wrote:
During his campaign, President Obama also associated himself frequently with the
self-branded champion of women, and the premier promoter of a linkage between
birth control, abortion, and women’s freedom: the Planned Parenthood Federation of
America. Planned Parenthood donated 15 million dollars of campaign advertisements
to the President’s re-election campaign. And the President continued strenuously to
support both federal and state grants for Planned Parenthood, for hundreds of millions
dollars annually, as well as to deploy his Administration’s Department of Justice to
states where legislatures had re-directed their family planning funds away from local
Planned Parenthoods, in favor of providers without an abortion connection. The
Department of Justice threatened these states with the withdrawal of all federal
Medicaid funding for all services for the poor. Very likely, President Obama’s close
association with Planned Parenthood strengthened his campaign’s and his
Administration’s publicity regarding their support for women. It also raised questions
about the objectivity of the Mandate and the Report supporting it—both of which
were mirror images of Planned Parenthood’s agenda, and that of its former research
affiliate, the Guttmacher Institute, respecting contraception and religious objectors.
Id. at 387. See supra note 28 (discussing the links between the Administration, abortion
providers, and the manufacturer of Plan B).
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See supra Part II.B.5 (discussing the meeting between President Obama and Archbishop
Dolan).
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Taranto, supra note 63.
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President Obama gave Dolan permission to share that message with the other
bishops.313
Two months later, in January 2012, President Obama called Archbishop Dolan
“to say that the mandates remain in place and that there would be no substantive
change, and that the only thing he could offer [the archbishop] was that [the Catholic
Church and its institutions] would have until August.”314 In his account of this call,
Dolan explained:
I said, “Mr. President, I appreciate the call. Are you saying now that we
have until August to introduce to you continual concerns that might
trigger a substantive mitigation in these mandates?” He said, “No, the
mandates remain. We’re more or less giving you this time to find out how
you’re going to be able to comply.” I said, “Well, sir, we don’t need the
[extra time]. I can tell you now we’re unable to comply.”315
A few weeks later, in the wake of a strong public response to the
Administration’s hard-lined approach, President Obama called Archbishop Dolan to
indicate that the Administration was developing a plan to shift the cost of paying for
the mandated coverage to insurers.316
In February 2012, the Departments finalized the interim final rules, adopting
them without any substantive change.317 At the same time, the Administration
announced the one-year enforcement safe harbor for non-exempt, nonprofit religious
organizations with religious objections and its plan to develop narrowly defined
accommodations.318
d.

Transparency

The Departments’ decision to adopt the mandate through interim final
rulemakings in July 2010 and August 2011, and their reliance on exemptions from
the standard notice-and-comment rulemaking process, thwarted transparency in the
adoption of the mandate.319 Additionally, the Administration decided to use a
sympathetic IOM Committee to provide a favorable sifting of evidence and to put a
medical- and social-scientific veneer on the Administration’s political and policy
commitments.320 Consequently, the IOM Committee recommendation process
afforded the Administration a forum to ensure the success of its desired policy
outcomes, while giving the appearance of openness, scientific grounding, and

313

Id.
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Id.
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Id.

316 Id. Archbishop Dolan was elevated to cardinal on February 18, 2012, which was after
his meeting and conversations with the President but before this account was published in The
Wall Street Journal. Id.
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See supra Part II.B.5.
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meaningful deliberation and obtaining the political and legal advantages that come
from the endorsement of an “independent expert” panel.321
The Committee itself did not ensure transparency and information disclosure in
its work, and the Committee’s membership and invited witnesses failed to represent
the broader array of public views on the issues.322 In his dissenting opinion,
Professor Lo Sasso observed:
[T]he committee process for evaluation of the evidence lacked
transparency and was largely subject to the preferences of the
committee’s composition. Troublingly, the process tended to result in a
mix of objective and subjective determinations filtered through a lens of
advocacy. An abiding principle in the evaluation of the evidence and the
recommendations put forth as a consequence should be transparency and
strict objectivity, but the committee failed to demonstrate these principles
in the Report.323
e. Trust
The procedures used by the Administration and the substantive policy developed
did not build and maintain public trust. Rather, the Administration’s infringements
of religious freedom and conscience, the way in which it went about developing and
imposing the mandate, its delay in exempting religious employers and
accommodating non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations with religious
objections, and the narrowness of the religious-employer exemption and
accommodations likely contributed to some of the decline President Obama has
experienced in trustworthiness.324
321 See U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs, News Release, Affordable Care Act
Ensures Women Receive Preventive Services at No Additional Cost (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://wayback.archive-it.org/3926/20140108162111/http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011
pres/08/20110801b.html (“HHS directed the independent Institute of Medicine to, for the first
time ever, conduct a scientific review and provide recommendations on specific preventive
measures that meet women’s unique health needs and help keep women healthy. HHS’ Health
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) used the IOM report issued July 19, when
developing the guidelines that are being issued today. The IOM’s report relied on independent
physicians, nurses, scientists, and other experts to make these determinations based on
scientific evidence.”). The Institute of Medicine, the health arm of the National Academy of
Sciences, is “an independent, nonprofit organization that works outside of government to
provide unbiased and authoritative advice to decision makers and the public.” See About the
IOM, INST. OF MED.EDU, http://www.iom.edu/About-IOM.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).
Although the National Academies are “independent,” about eighty-five percent of their
funding comes from the federal government through contracts and grants from federal
agencies. See Div. on Eng’g and Physical Scis., DEPS—Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L
ACAD. OF SCI.ORG, http://sites.nationalacademies.org/DEPS/DEPS_037300 (last visited Jan.
25, 2015). The funding that supported the IOM Committee’s work on the report and
recommendations on preventive services for women came from HHS’s Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. See supra note 3128 and accompanying text.
322

See supra Part II.B.2 and notes 306, 310 (discussing committee members and invited
witnesses).
323
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CLOSING THE GAPS REPORT, supra note 31, at 232–33.

Susan Heavey/Reuters, Majority of Americans Think Obama Is not Honest or
Trustworthy: Poll, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 25, 2013, available at
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The Justificatory Conditions

Analysis of the mandate under the general moral considerations shows both the
Administration’s failure to demonstrate that the mandate was warranted based upon
the benefits, the harms, and the utility, and the conflict that exists between the
benefits, the harm prevention, and the utility claimed by the Administration and the
other general moral considerations proposed by Childress and his colleagues.325
Consequently, under the framework of Childress and his colleagues, further analysis
is required based on the justificatory conditions, and the Administration, as the
proponent of the public health initiative, would bear the burden of justifying the
mandate.
a.

Effectiveness

In their rulemakings, the Departments did not demonstrate the mandate’s
effectiveness. In the July 2010 rulemaking, for instance, the Departments discussed
the new coverage requirements in the ACA, the ACA’s and the Administration’s
general policy favoring utilization of preventive services, factors that contributed to
underutilization of preventive services, and benefits expected to result from the
coverage mandates.326 In this rulemaking, however, the Departments did not
specifically show that the contraceptive coverage mandate would protect public
health or that the mandate would realize the Departments’ goals, which they did not
articulate until their February 2012 rulemaking.327 Likewise, in the August 2011
rulemaking, the Departments did not make any such effectiveness showing.328
In its report, the IOM Committee discussed the effectiveness and costeffectiveness of contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient
education and counseling in preventing pregnancies.329 Although the Committee
noted coverage practices in private and public health insurance and some existing
coverage recommendations, the Committee did not show that the clinical
effectiveness of methods and procedures would result in the achievement of the
Administration’s public health and gender equity goals or that the mandated
coverage would achieve the Administration’s identified goals.330 The closest the
Committee came to this type of effectiveness assessment is found in the following
statements:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/25/obama-poll_n_4337643.html. In a November
2013 poll, which was released just four months after the Administration issued the final rules
on the mandate, the religious-employer exemption, and the accommodations, 53 percent of
those polled indicated that the President was not honest or trustworthy, which “mark[ed] the
first time that the CNN/ORC polling found a clear majority questioning the president’s
integrity.” Id.
325

See supra Parts IV.C.1–2.

326
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It is thought that greater use of long-acting, reversible contraceptive
methods—including intrauterine devices and contraceptive implants that
require less action by the woman and therefore have lower use failure
rates—might help further reduce unintended pregnancy rates . . . The
elimination of cost sharing for contraception therefore could greatly
increase its use, including use of the more effective and longer-acting
methods, especially among poor and low-income women most at risk for
unintended pregnancy.331
In his dissenting statement, Professor Lo Sasso identified a fundamental flaw in
the Committee’s effectiveness assessment – the Committee “lack[ed] . . . a coherent
framework to evaluate coverage apart from the evidence regarding clinical
efficacy.”332 The Committee’s inability to evaluate the effectiveness of the
contraceptive coverage mandate may stem from this methodological deficiency, as
well as the fact that the Committee had “barely six months from the time the group
was empanelled” to review all evidence of preventive services and issue the final
report.333
Accordingly, the Administration did not make the necessary showing that the
mandate was likely to protect public health and achieve gender equity. This failure
undercuts its justification for infringing one or more general moral considerations.
b.

Proportionality

In the July 2010 and August 2011 rulemakings, the Departments did not show
that the probable public health benefits outweighed the infringed general moral
considerations (such as breached autonomy/liberty).334 Indeed, these rulemakings do
not reveal much of any willingness on the part of the Departments to acknowledge
that the mandate caused any infringement. However, in the August 2011 rulemaking,
the Departments acknowledged that an exception was warranted for a very narrow
class of religious employers, and they expressed their view that this narrow
definition “reasonably balance[d]” their goal of extending coverage broadly with
“respecting the unique relationship between certain religious employers and their
employees in certain religious positions.”335 Implicit in the Departments’ discussion
was an assumption that the benefits outweigh any other infringement, and thus the
Departments did not assign relative weights or weigh perceived benefits against any
other infringement.
In the February 2012 rulemaking, the Departments gave more attention to the
claimed benefits of the mandate and to possible infringements.336 In this rulemaking,
the Departments addressed, for the first time, conscience protections in federal laws,
the religious beliefs of organizations and individuals other than those in their

331

Id. at 108–09 (emphasis added).
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Id. at 233.
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narrowly defined class of religious employers, the First Amendment, and RFRA.337
The Departments’ announcement of the one-year enforcement safe harbor and their
plan to develop accommodations for non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations
with religious objections may constitute something of a concession regarding
possible infringements.338 But, in any event, they deemed their interests compelling
and concluded that their approach was consistent with the First Amendment and
RFRA.339 Consequently, the Departments failed to provide a careful assessment of
proportionality between the claimed benefits and the infringements. Instead, the
Departments manifested a commitment to retain the mandate, which was already in
effect, and a willingness to make only minor adjustments for narrowly defined
classes of religious employers and non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations
with religious objections.340
In the July 2013 rulemaking, the Departments gave more attention to the First
Amendment and RFRA issues, but their assessment extended only to questions
related to religious employers and non-exempt, nonprofit religious organizations
with religious objections.341 In the regulatory materials, they expressed their view
that the accommodations did not violate RFRA and that the religious-employer
exemption and the accommodations did not violate the First Amendment.342
The various rules adopted by the Departments and the accompanying regulatory
materials do not evidence a fulsome balancing of all positive features and benefits
against the negative features and consequences. To the extent that a proportionality
assessment was performed, it was late, and it was restricted to a narrow class of
religious employers and narrowly-defined accommodations of non-exempt,
nonprofit religious organizations with religious objections. At no time did the
Departments perform a proportionality assessment as to for-profit organizations.
Accordingly, proponents of the mandate failed to make the requisite showing that the
probable public health benefits outweighed infringed general moral considerations.
c.

Necessity and Least Infringement

In their rulemakings, the Departments failed to show that the required coverage
of all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, patient
education and counseling was necessary to realize the Administration’s public health
and gender equity goals, and they were late in addressing whether less infringing or
less restrictive alternatives were available.343 Judging from the rulemakings and
regulatory materials, it does not appear that the Department sensed an obligation to
address questions of necessity and less infringing alternatives as to contraceptive
337
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supra note 139.
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coverage, perhaps in part because the ACA mandated coverage of preventive health
services. The issues should not, however, be conflated because Congress did not
require that all FDA-approved contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures be
included within the package of covered preventive health services.344
In the July 2010 rulemaking, the Departments discussed the ACA coverage
requirements, the ACA’s and the Administration’s general policy favoring utilization
of preventive services, factors that contributed to underutilization of preventive
services, and benefits expected to result from the coverage mandates generally.345
The Departments referenced the need to address market failures that lead to
underutilization of preventive services and barriers that result from cost sharing.346
The Departments also asserted that their rules were necessary because plan sponsors
and issuers needed to know how to provide the coverage without cost sharing.347 In
conclusory terms, the Departments asserted that their rules regarding coverage of
preventive services were “designed to be the least burdensome alternative.”348
Neither the IOM Committee nor HRSA assessed whether the contraceptive
coverage mandate was necessary to realize the Administration’s goals. Indeed, one
of the criticisms highlighted by Professor Lo Sasso in his dissenting opinion was the
Committee’s failure to show that the services will accomplish the desired goals, let
alone that the coverage mandate was necessary to realize the Administration’s public
health and gender equity goals: “[T]he [Committee’s] recommendations were made
without high quality, systematic evidence of the preventive nature of the services
considered. Put differently, evidence that use of the services in question leads to
lower rates of disability or disease and increased rates of well-being is generally
absent.”349 Additionally, neither the IOM Committee nor HRSA evaluated
alternative means of realizing the goals.
Likewise, in their August 3, 2011 rulemaking, the Departments did not closely
scrutinize the necessity of the contraceptive coverage mandate to realize the
Administration’s public health goals or evaluate alternative means of realizing the
public health goals apart from the mandate.350 As the “need” for regulatory action in
this rulemaking, the Departments cited their assessment that an amendment to the
interim final rule was warranted to provide HRSA discretion to exempt certain
religious employers.351
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348 Id. at 41,739. By choosing to use the interim final rulemaking process, the Departments
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under the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. The
Departments did provide a conclusory assessment that their rules were “consistent with the
policy embodied in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.” Id.
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With the February 2012 rulemaking, the Departments, in response to the high
volume of comments that had been submitted, began to think about some
alternatives as they considered accommodations for non-exempt, nonprofit religious
organizations with religious objections.352 Although the Departments’ development
of accommodations does represent an effort to minimize some infringement caused
by the mandate, the accommodations had a narrow scope, and the accommodations
did not extend beyond the narrow class of organizations identified by the
Departments.353
In the July 2013 rulemaking, the Departments finalized the rules regarding the
religious-employer exemption and the accommodations, and they directly addressed
alternatives to the mandate.354 Commenters on the Departments’ February 2013
proposed rules had suggested various alternatives to the mandated contraceptive
coverage: the government could provide contraceptive services to all women free of
charge; the government could establish a government-funded health benefits
program for contraceptive services; the government could require drug and device
manufacturers to provide contraceptive drugs and devices free of charge; and the
government could require multi-state plans on the exchanges to offer a stand-alone,
contraceptive-only benefit to all women without charge.355
The Departments offered several responses. First, the suggested alternatives
“were not feasible and/or would not advance the government’s compelling interests
as effectively as the mechanisms established” in the final rules and the preventive
health services coverage regulations generally.356 Second, the Departments lacked
the statutory authority and funding to implement the proposed alternatives.357 Third,
the ACA contemplates that the existing employer-based system of health insurance
would provide coverage of recommended preventive services so that “women face
minimal logistical and administrative obstacles.”358 Fourth, imposing additional
requirements on women receiving the intended coverage “would make that coverage
accessible to fewer women.”359 Although these responses addressed alternatives
proposed by commenters, the responses were conclusory, and the Departments did
not otherwise attempt to find a less infringing or less restrictive alternative.
Because of the Administration’s failure to address carefully questions of
necessity and less infringing alternatives, the mandate was challenged in dozens of
cases throughout the nation.360 As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court eventually
determined that the Administration failed to show that the mandate was the least
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restrictive means of furthering the claimed interests.361 According to the Court, the
Administration had “not shown that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal
without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting
parties in these cases.”362 The Court added:
The most straightforward way of doing this would be for the Government
to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any
women who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance
policies due to their employers’ religious objections. This would certainly
be less restrictive of the plaintiffs’ religious liberty, and [the
Administration] has not shown that this is not a viable alternative.363
Under the framework proposed by Childress and his colleagues, the
Administration failed to justify the mandate by showing both that it was necessary to
realize the public health goals and that it was the least infringing or the least
restrictive option among alternatives. These were showings that the Administration
was required to make as the proponent of this public health policy, especially given
the coercive nature of the mandate.
d.

Public Justification

The Departments chose to use the interim final rulemaking process (and not the
standard notice-and-comment rulemaking process in its first two rulemakings) and to
make use of an IOM Committee partially composed of representatives of pro-choice
advocacy groups that had a short timeframe in which to generate a report and
recommendations.364 By making these choices, the Departments accelerated the
rulemaking process, but they also suppressed public participation. By sidestepping
the standard notice-and-rulemaking process, the Departments missed important
opportunities both to gain the benefit of feedback from the public and interested
persons and to provide a public justification for the mandate. Although the
Departments’ manipulation of the rulemaking process ensured their success in
putting the mandate in place upon HRSA’s adoption of the IOM Committee’s
hurriedly-prepared report and recommendations and HRSA’s issuance of its
guidelines, the process they selected gave the public limited opportunity for input
and required the Departments to provide only limited justification for their mandate.
Such manipulation of process runs directly counter to the understanding of
Childress and his colleagues regarding public justification and public accountability
in public health activities.365 Under their framework, the federal government was to
ensure a public process that included proposals, justifications, deliberation, feedback,
reconsideration, and a final decision.366 Additionally, Childress and his colleagues
361
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wrote: “the public, along with scientific experts, plays an important role in the
analysis of public health issues, as well as in the development and assessment of
appropriate strategies for addressing them.”367
In the case of the mandate, the Departments restricted the public’s participation
both in the analysis of the issues and in the development and assessment of
appropriate strategies. The Administration also failed to explain and justify the
infringement of one or more general moral considerations. To the extent that the
Administration provided justification to the public and to the individuals, religious
institutions, nonprofit organizations, and businesses burdened by the mandate for its
infringement of one or more general moral considerations, the justification was late
and lacking. Thus, with public justification, as with the other justificatory conditions,
the Administration failed to make the requisite showing.
D. The Administration’s Failure of Deliberation and Justification in This Public
Health Initiative
An application of the framework proposed by Childress and his colleagues
suggests significant deficiencies in the Administration’s deliberation regarding, and
justification of, the mandate. The Departments failed to evaluate various general
moral considerations, recognize the conflicts among considerations caused by the
mandate, and provide an adequate public justification of their public health initiative
and their infringement of important values. In the final analysis, this public health
initiative began poorly with the Departments’ decision to proceed by interim final
rulemaking—not just once, but twice—and public and transparent deliberation about
and justifications for the mandate have been very slow in coming. This is hardly
what Childress and his colleagues contemplated in their framework for carefully
evaluating public health policies, practices, and activities and resolving conflicts
among moral considerations.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed the contraceptive coverage mandate from three
perspectives. It explored the rulemaking processes used by executive departments of
the federal government in developing the mandate, including their use of an IOM
Committee to develop recommendations. This analysis highlighted the Obama
Administration’s decisions to bypass standard regulatory procedures and instead to
use the interim final rulemaking process, which restricted public participation in the
development of the rules and hampered transparency and deliberation in the
rulemaking process. This Article also analyzed the mandate under the framework
that Congress mandated in RFRA. This analysis showed that the Departments
overlooked this legal standard in its first several rulemakings and failed to consider
carefully the burden their mandate placed on the negative right of religious freedom.
Finally, this Article analyzed the mandate under the public health policy and ethics
(the numerical, political, and communal publics) in the process of formulating public health
policies, practices, and actions, as well as justifying to the relevant publics what is being
undertaken.” Id. at 173. Additionally, “[a]t a minimum, public accountability involves
transparency in openly seeking information from those affected and in honestly disclosing
relevant information to the public; it is indispensable for engendering and sustaining public
trust, as well as for expressing justice.” Id.
367
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framework proposed by Professor Childress and his colleagues. This analysis
showed that the Administration’s deliberation failed to address adequately several
general moral considerations and conflicts among considerations and failed to justify
the mandate’s infringements.
In addition to providing these three analyses, this study has also provided insight
regarding the moral decision-making inherent in policymaking and lawmaking and
in the public health enterprise. The mandate is a piece of progressive “legislation.”368
It was not enacted by the duly-elected representatives of the American people.
Rather, the mandate was made through the sorts of administrative rulemaking
processes that progressives have preferred for the better part of a century:
“administratively organized ‘communities’ of highly trained, objective
professionals” with quasi-legislative powers making rules based upon “unbiased”
physical and social sciences, technical expertise, and empirical data with the goal of
leading society forward and bringing about transformative social, legal, and
economic reforms.369 The mandate (and the Administration’s arguments defending
against challenges to the mandate) also exhibited the longstanding opposition of
progressives to the interests of businesses and business owners who are viewed as
obstacles to social progress.370
This progressive approach to policymaking and lawmaking obscures some of the
moral decision-making inherent in such regulatory activity, but the analytical
framework of Childress and his colleagues helps to reveal more fully the moral
decision-making that is in fact involved. As discussed above, public health activities
are often understood to have a teleological or consequentialist orientation.371 And, in
the framework proposed by Childress and his colleagues, consequentialism is
evident in their first three general moral considerations: producing benefits,
preventing harms, and maximizing utility (i.e., the balance of benefits over costs).372
Professor Gostin agrees that moral decision-making lies at the heart of public health
policymaking:
Since a principal aim of public health is to achieve the greatest health benefits for
the greatest number of people, it draws from the traditions of consequentialism,
which judges the rightness of an action by the consequences, effects, or outcomes
that it produces. Utilitarianism, one of the most influential forms of consequentialist
ethical theory, holds that actions are justified insofar as they promote the greatest
happiness of the greatest number of people.373
368 Although the mandate is not technically legislation passed by a legislative body, in
administrative law parlance the rules that promulgated the mandate are legislative rules. See
Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 738 F.3d 387, 395 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (“Notice and comment rulemaking procedures are required under the
[Administrative Procedure Act] when substantive rules are promulgated, modified, or
revoked. Substantive or legislative rules are those that grant rights, impose obligations, or
produce other significant effects on private interests, or which effect a change in existing law
or policy.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
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Although the mandate is encased in regulatory, social scientific, medical, and
public health terminology, the analytical framework proposed by Childress and his
colleagues helps to show that the regulations and the mandate itself are predicated
upon moral judgments and reflect a moral vision. The moral underpinnings of the
mandate become apparent when the Administration’s utilitarian calculus is isolated:
the interests in public health and gender equity are compelling and outweigh the less
weighty interests that individuals, institutions, and organizations coerced by the
mandate might have in religious liberty, conscience, and economic freedom. True to
its public health goals, the Administration in its mandate favored a population over
individuals.
For the Administration, the perceived benefits outweighed the costs. In the
rulemakings and accompanying regulatory materials, the Administration lauded the
anticipated benefits of readily-accessible preventive services, including a healthier
population, disease prevention, earlier treatment, and reduced health care costs.
Drawing on the IOM Committee’s report, it cited various possible benefits: meeting
the basic health care needs of women; preventing unintended pregnancies (whether
unwanted or mistimed); promoting healthy birth spacing; avoiding contraindicated
pregnancies; saving employers pregnancy-related costs and costs related to absences
and reduced productivity; removing the out-of-pocket-expense barrier to effective
contraception; helping women achieve equal standing in the workforce; and
improving the socio-economic status of women. The Administration retained a
narrow religious-employer exemption because it believed a broader exemption
would lead to more employees paying out of pocket for contraceptive services,
which would make it less likely that employees would have access to and use
contraceptives.
The Administration deemed the costs to be minor. It asserted that the mandate
does not undermine religious and conscience exemptions in federal law and that the
rules are consistent with the First Amendment and RFRA. In the February 2012
rulemaking, the Administration’s utility balancers asserted in conclusory terms that
its “approach complies with [RFRA], which generally requires a federal law to not
substantially burden religious exercise, or, if it does substantially burden religious
exercise, to be the least restrictive means to further a compelling government
interest.”374 Thus, even RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard posed no problem for the
mandate because the Administration viewed the claimed interests as compelling. In
the end, forcing individuals and organizations to violate the religious beliefs or
conscience did not have much weight for the Administration’s utility balancers.
On its face, utilitarian balancing (such as was used by the Administration in
adopting the mandate) appears objective and capable of leading to indisputable
conclusions. But, in reality, such moral reasoning leads to preordained conclusions
that conform to the values of decision-makers. In other words, utilitarian balancing
affords policymakers an opportunity to put their own thumbs on the scale as they
import their own values and assign their values more weight and opposing values
less weight. It appears that this is precisely what happened in the development of the
mandate.
Furthermore, this mode of moral decision-making emphasizes immediate and
concrete interests, while deemphasizing or ignoring more remote, more abstract, or

374

Final Rules, supra note 59, at 8729.

2015]

LEGISLATING MORALITY PROGRESSIVELY

119

less convenient interests.375 In the case of the mandate, the Administration’s analysis
gave no weight to the status of the unborn, even though several FDA-approved
contraception methods prevent fertilized eggs (human embryos) from implanting in
the uterus. The moral concerns of Americans who understand these methods to
constitute abortion, and not contraception, were given little or no weight by the
Administration.376
For the Administration and present-day progressives, health care reform has been
a moral undertaking,377 and the contraceptive coverage mandate is an integral part of
their larger moral endeavor. The mandate is predicated upon the Administration’s
moral judgments, and once we acknowledge that the Administration in promulgating
the mandate legislated morality, we can more clearly identify the contours of the
Administration’s moral vision—its vision of the good and the just society—that
375 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. offered a similar assessment in his criticism of the
Supreme Court’s use of a balancing test to determine whether Congress violated Article III of
the Constitution by delegating power to an agency to adjudicate some common-law claims.
Justice Brennan stated:

[Balancing] pits an interest the benefits of which are immediate, concrete, and easily
understood against one, the benefits of which are almost entirely prophylactic, and
thus often seem remote and not worth the cost in any single case. Thus, while
balancing creates the illusion of objectivity and ineluctability, in fact the result was
foreordained, because the balance is weighted against judicial independence.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 863 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
376 The USCCB has made its moral and religious objections to abortion and abortifacient
drugs and devices widely known. See USCCB, DOES THE HHS MANDATE INCLUDE
ABORTIFACIENTS? (Apr. 3, 2014), http://usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-anddignity/contraception/upload/Does-the-HHS-Mandate-Include-Abortifacients.pdf. The
Catholic Church in the United States has nearly 70 million members, and it is the largest
religious group in the country. See Hartford Inst. for Religious Research, Fast Facts About
American Religion, HARTFORD INST. FOR RELIGIOUS RESEARCH, http://hirr.hartsem.edu/
research/fastfacts/fast_facts.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2015). In a recent poll, fifty-eight
percent of respondents say that abortion should be illegal or legal in few circumstances, and
fifty-six oppose the use of public funds for abortions for women who cannot afford them. See
CNN Poll: Wide Divide over Abortion, CNN (Mar. 6, 2014), http://politicalticker.blogs.
cnn.com/2014/03/06/cnn-poll-wide-divide-over-abortion/. In another recent poll, thirty-five
percent of respondents agreed that employers should be able to choose the forms of
contraceptives their health plans cover based on their religious beliefs. See Joan Biskupic, A
Majority of Americans Oppose Restrictions on Contraceptive Insurance Coverage, Says Poll,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 30, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Latest-NewsWires/2014/0630/A-majority-of-Americans-oppose-restrictions-on-contraception-insurancecoverage-says-poll-video. In an earlier poll, fifty percent of respondents expressed disapproval
of the Administration’s contraceptive coverage mandate. See CNN Poll: Half Oppose Obama
Birth Control Insurance Plan, CNN (Feb. 16, 2012), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/
02/16/cnn-poll-half-oppose-obama-birth-control-insurance-plan/. In another poll, fifty-one
percent favored allowing employers to opt out of birth control coverage for moral or religious
reasons. See N.Y. Times/CBS News Poll: President Obama’s Approval Rating Drops, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/03/13/us/politics/presidentobamas-approval-rating-drops.html?ref=politics&_r=0.
377
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inspired the development of and is embedded within the mandate. The mandate is
meant to change economic and social structures, and it advances the
Administration’s vision of social justice. It also advances the Administration’s vision
of women’s freedom and gender equity by requiring businesses, institutions, and
individuals to fund the provision of broad and free access to FDA-approved
contraceptive, sterilization, and family planning services. Additionally, the mandate
is premised upon the moral values of the policymakers regarding the family, human
sexuality, and the status of the unborn. Furthermore, the mandate expresses the
Administration’s moral judgment that its vision of public health and gender equity
should be advanced even at the expense of religious freedom, matters of conscience,
and the economic freedom of individuals and organizations.
Professor Gostin has warned, however, that the legitimacy of the public health
enterprise is threatened when the enterprise becomes captive to ideology and
political advocacy.378 He wrote: “By espousing controversial issues of economic
redistribution and social restructuring, the field risks losing its legitimacy. Public
health gains credibility from its adherence to science, and if it strays too far into
political advocacy, it may lose the appearance of objectivity.”379 It may be that the
Administration’s mandate (along with its failures in reasoned deliberation, fair and
transparent process, and respect for autonomy and liberty, and its failures to maintain
public trust and provide public justification) will become a prime example of a
public health initiative delegitimized by the actions of its proponents.
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